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CHAPTER 1  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces and provides background information on the issue being researched.  
Notably, this chapter will address the reason that this research is being undertaken by 
providing the statistics underpinning regional trade in Southern Africa.  Finally, this chapter 
will look at how the arguments presented in this research paper will be substantiated in the 
various chapters.  Critical in this latter endeavour will be the sources that this research paper 
relies on and the methodology that it adopts. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The Southern African Development Community Free Trade Area (SADC FTA) was 
officially launched at the 28
th
 SADC Summit in August 2008 by 11 of the 15 SADC Member 
States against the backdrop of the global financial and economic crisis.
1
  By January of 2008, 
about 85% of goods from the participating Member States attained zero duty and a Common 
Tariff System was applied to the import of goods from non-Member States.  Further, the 
SADC Protocol on Trade in Services was developed and signed in August, 2012 as a step 
towards achieving a Free Trade Area (FTA) in services.  Prior to these milestones, the Trade 
Protocol (TP) had been developed and signed in 1996 with the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) developed and signed in 2003.  All of these policy moves 
resulted in the SADC Common Agenda.
2
 
 
The challenge, and opportunity, presented by the global financial and economic crisis is that 
countries of the South needed to diversify from their traditional trading partners in Europe 
                                                          
1
 Bua News ‘SADC launches free trade area’, available at http://www.southafrica.info/africa/sadc-
fta.htm (accessed 21 March 2013). 
2
 SADC ‘Integration Milestones’, available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-
common-agenda/ (accessed 21 March 2013).  The SADC Common Agenda refers to the set of 
foundational principles and values that guide the SADC’s regional integration agenda.  The SADC 
Common Agenda is contained in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (as amended, 2009), as well as in the 
Review of Operations of SADC Institutions. 
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and North America.
3
  As Africa is projected to have a population of 2.191 billion people by 
2050, with 67.327 million of these in Southern Africa,
4
 the scope and opportunity for intra-
regional trade in Southern Africa is therefore becoming an attractive proposition.  Due to the 
challenge of infrastructure, intra-regional trade in Southern Africa is lagging behind the trade 
between Southern African countries and their traditional trading partners – even during the 
global economic and financial crisis.
5
  It is argued that a lack of robust intra-regional trade 
translates to consumers in Southern Africa (i) having access to few competing products and 
(ii) paying higher prices than their peers in more developed economies.  The main driver of 
this inequity is that markets are restricted to national markets and competition is therefore 
also national in scope.  The notion of comparative advantage in the region does not hold 
true.
6
  Further, companies’ accretion of market share or growth (organic or through 
acquisitions) is hampered due to varying regulatory regimes and market requirements.
7
  In the 
end, both consumers and the private sector operate under sub-optimum trading conditions at 
the regional level.   
 
The challenge of regional integration is largely a function of the lack of sufficient hard
8
 and 
soft
9
 infrastructure which will be an enabler of seamless business relations in Southern 
Africa.  That regional integration in Africa has largely been undertaken by bureaucrats and 
the role and potential of public-private partnerships
10
 has received scant or poor attention.
11 
                                                          
3
 The Economic Times ‘Changing global trade patterns’, available at 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-05-14/news/27606822_1_global-trade-
manufacturing-exports-world-trade (accessed 21 March 2013).  
4
 United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs: Population Division – Population 
Estimates and Projections Section, available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm 
(accessed on 21 March 2013).  
5
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism (4). 
6
 Comparative advantage refers to the ability of a country to produce a particular good or service at a 
lower marginal and opportunity cost over another. Even if one country is more efficient in the 
production of all goods (absolute advantage in all goods) than the other, both countries will still gain 
by trading with each other, as long as they have different relative efficiencies. 
7
 H Jalilian, C Kirkpatrick and D Parker ‘The impact of regulation on economic growth in developing 
countries: A cross-country analysis’ (2006) 11 – 16, available at 
https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/bitstream/1826/1455/1/Impact%2520of%2520regulation-
Economic%2520growth-March06.pdf (accessed 21 March 2013). 
8
 Referring to tangible infrastructure like rail, roads, ports and air transport. 
9
 Referring to customs software and regulatory regimes.  
10
 The World Bank defines public-private partnerships as “arrangements, typically medium to long 
term, between the public and private sectors whereby some of the services that fall under the 
responsibilities of the public sector are provided by the private sector, with clear agreement on shared 
objectives for delivery of public infrastructure and/ or public services.”  World Bank, “What are 
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This research paper, therefore, will focus on (i) the challenges and opportunities presented by 
hard infrastructure and (ii) the potential scope of public-private partnerships in alleviating 
such challenges and responding to the opportunities.   
 
This research paper, as a secondary objective, cautions against missing an opportunity to 
advocate for the deployment of capital in a manner that benefits the region and gives 
sufficient returns to investors.  Simply put, such a failure has the potential to derail the 
regional integration project in Southern Africa.  This would translate to consumers and 
market participants being subjected to a finite market
12
, less competition, higher prices
13
 and 
less innovation
14
.   
 
In responding to the above analyses, this research paper undertakes a thorough study of the 
current legal framework and practices in SADC which allow for participation of the private 
sector in public-private partnerships. In this regard, this research paper will consider which 
between institutionalisation or the ad hoc participation of the private sector in public-private 
partnerships is a viable policy goal for the SADC.   
 
1.3 Significance of the research 
 
Southern Africa’s regional trade landscape is characterised by inefficient and costly rules and 
cross-border trade procedures (for example, no standardised customs declarations or health 
standards for the export of meat products) due to poorly designed and implemented regional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Public Private Partnerships?”  Available at http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-partnerships (accessed 9 January 2014).  
11
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2006, “Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa II: Rationalising Regional Economic Communities”, Addis Ababa, UN 
Economic Commission for Africa at page 86, available at www.uneca.org (accessed 21 March 2013).  
12
 The market will be restricted to a national market which is susceptible to domestic factors 
influencing either mortality or population growth.  
13
 Less competition and the absence of comparative advantage in the region will lead to higher prices.  
An attempt to increase intra-SADC trade under the prevailing regional trade conditions may 
marginally alleviate the problem but will not significantly affect it in light of the non-tariff barriers 
that exist.  
14
 Innovation will be limited to national markets and the prospects of creating synergies between high 
innovation and low innovation countries will be limited. In this regard, technology transfers in the 
region will be stifled.  
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integration initiatives.
15
  The problem is compounded by the lack of investment in hard 
infrastructure to serve as an enabler of regional integration.
16
   
 
It is argued that this lack of investment in infrastructure ultimately results in higher prices for 
consumers in Southern Africa as cross border traders have to factor in duplicate customs 
costs, higher vehicle maintenance costs as well waiting time at border posts.  Thus, the 
opportunities and challenges presented by public-private partnerships have to be properly 
understood and resolved to allow investors
17
 to undertake these public-private partnerships in 
a predictable and stable environment. 
 
Notably, private sector players, i.e. investors are a useful feedback conduit to policymakers 
on the efficacy or shortcomings of the implementation (and perhaps design) of regional 
integration initiatives as they are market players.
18
  An effective feedback mechanism 
therefore cannot be implemented if it excludes the most significant market player: the private 
sector.  As a sector that is interested in maximising profit and cutting unnecessary costs, this 
paper argues that the private sector has enough incentive to enter into public-private 
partnerships which open up new markets for them.  Equally, policymakers have enough 
incentive to partner with the investment community as they (i) do not have the necessary 
funds to self-fund large infrastructure projects and (ii) want to improve consumer welfare in 
the region.  The scope of partnership, however, needs to be broadened from the traditional 
investor role to one of partnership which includes policy formulation and implementation.   
 
                                                          
15
 T Dinka and W.1 Kennes ‘Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges’ 
(2007) ECDPM Discussion Paper 74, Chapter 3, available at 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform&http://www.ec
dpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/0aff1ee6dde15146c12579ce004774b2?OpenDoc
ument (accessed 14 August 2013) 
16
 T Dinka and W.1 Kennes ‘Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges’ 
(2007) ECDPM Discussion Paper 74, Section 3.4, available at 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform&http://www.ec
dpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/0aff1ee6dde15146c12579ce004774b2?OpenDoc
ument (accessed 14 August 2013). 
17
 ‘investors’ or ‘investment community’ refers to that part of the financial services sector which is 
concerned with the deployment of capital for infrastructure projects as an investor and not only a 
lendor.  
18
 SAIIA ‘PERISA Case Study 1 Private Sector The Non-Tariff Barrier Monitoring Mechanism’ 
(2013), available at http://www.saiia.org.za/news/new-publication-series-the-political-economy-of-
regional-integration-in-africa (accessed 14 August 2013).  
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1.4 Selected methodology 
 
In supporting and / or casting doubt on some of the arguments postulated in this research 
paper, reliance will be placed on the primary texts of the SADC, i.e. the treaty and protocols 
published under the treaty, and reports of the Secretary General of the SADC.  Secondary 
sources such as the reports produced by the World Bank Group, journal articles and 
newspaper sources will be relied on.  Put differently, this research paper will rely, primarily 
on document analysis in reaching its conclusions.  
 
It is intended that empirical data on trade movements and the level of investment in 
infrastructure and related aspects will be utilised to support the arguments presented in this 
research paper.   
 
Finally, as the area of intra-regional trade is a topical one and is constantly evolving, use of 
internet sources is inevitable.  The websites of reputable think tanks in the field of regional 
integration will be consulted and where appropriate, referred to.   
 
In the circumstances, the research will be library and desktop based.  
 
1.5 Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 2 of this research paper considers the need for investment infrastructure development 
in Southern Africa.  In this regard, chapter 2 will consider the trade related statistics relating 
to (i) infrastructure backlog, (ii) cost of doing business in Southern Africa under the 
‘existing’ infrastructure and (ii) the cost of investing in new infrastructure.  Concomitant with 
this statistical analysis, this research paper will make out the case for why the SADC has to 
consider public – private partnerships as the most viable model for responding to its 
infrastructure development challenge.   
 
Chapters 3 and 4 consider the challenges and opportunities posed by the lack of infrastructure 
on regional integration in Southern Africa.  In this regard, these chapters analyse the 
‘legislative’ or legal framework for regional integration in Southern Africa and how these are 
implemented and monitored (if at all).  Further, these chapters consider the challenges posed 
by the traditional lendor role which the investment community has preferred thus far and 
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analyse the scope for mutually beneficial public – private partnerships.  Chapter 4, in its 
discussion of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan will argue that implicit in 
the various challenges outlined herein are opportunities for the investment community to 
deepen its participation in regional integration initiatives at both a policy level and an 
investment level.  Ultimately, chapter 4 will advance the argument that the investment 
community can provide a useful feedback mechanism for policy-makers on the efficacy of 
regional integration initiatives insofar as they relate to the positioning and deployment of 
capital in large infrastructure projects. 
 
Chapter 5 will outline the conclusions and recommendations drawn from this research paper 
and the preceding chapters.  The focus of this chapter will be on policy recommendations on 
how the existing regional integration initiatives can be improved in order to realise the stated 
benefits of regional integration.  Further, this chapter will succinctly state role public – 
private partnerships have to play in regional integration initiatives to ensure the success of 
regional integration in Southern Africa.  
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2.  
CHAPTER 2 
THE NEED FOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Mudzonga states that regional integration initiatives are attractive because they bring about 
economic growth and development, poverty alleviation, an enhanced standard and quality of 
life, and support for socially disadvantaged people.
19
  However, the gains identified by 
Mudzonga are not a priori and are dependent on the architecture of the regional integration 
initiative.  Despite a well-intentioned SADC Treaty, Trade Protocol and Regional Integration 
Strategy (which are all discussed in greater detail at chapters 3 and 4); the volume and value 
of intra-regional trade in Southern Africa is still relatively low and consumer welfare is 
consequently poor.   
 
2.2 Southern Africa trade statistics 
 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) 
Economic Development in Africa Report 2013
20
 (the UNCTAD Report), various empirical 
studies have demonstrated that trade in goods in Africa has been rising faster than that 
witnessed in the developed and comparable developing economies.
21
  Even so, the UNCTAD 
Report concludes that the African continent still accounts for a very low share of world trade.  
Put differently, African trade volumes and/or trade values still lag behind other regions as a 
percentage of global world trade.  In this regard, the UNCTAD Report notes that even though 
the level of trade in goods (comprising of exports and imports) between Africa and the rest of 
the world rose from US$251 billion in 1996 to US$1,151 billion in 2011 (indicating a more 
than quadruple increase in trade value), this is still negligible when compared with total 
                                                          
19
 Evengelista M ‘Implementation challenges for the SADC FTA: tariff and non-tariff barriers’ (2008) 
Proceedings of the Fifth Southern African Forum on Trade (SAFT) (2008).  
20
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 8 – 11.  
21
 Eurostat ‘ Africa – EU: Economic indicators, trade and investment’ available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Africa-EU_-
_economic_indicators,_trade_and_investment (accessed 14 August 2013).   
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world trade values.
22
  In 2011, exports and imports for Africa totalled $582 billion and $569 
billion respectively.
23
  From a nominal growth rate perspective, African trade kept pace with 
the surge in world trade that occurred over the last decade.  African exports to the world grew 
at an average annual rate of 17.5% during the period from 2001 to 2006, outperforming 
growth both among developing economies (which recorded an annual growth rate of 11.5%) 
and developed economies (which recorded an annual growth rate of 9.3%).
24
   
 
The trend continued in the period from 2007 to 2011, with African exports growing 
(annually) on average faster than those in the developing and developed worlds (12.2% as 
against 9.9% and 7.4%, respectively).
25
  The picture, insofar as it relates to imports into 
Africa followed the same trend, that is, imports into Africa grew nominally faster than those 
into the developing and developed worlds.
26
  Notably, African export performance remained 
strong over the period from 2007 to 2011 when only volume growth rates are considered.  In 
this regard, the UNCTAD Report notes that African exports rose in real terms at an annual 
rate of 5.2% compared to 4.8% for the world, 2.4% for developed economies and 2.9% for 
the developing Americas, albeit lower than that of developing Asia (which recorded 8.8%) 
and developing economies in general (which recorded 7.8%).
27
  Significantly, Africa still 
scored the highest real growth rate of all the above-mentioned categories of countries from an 
import perspective. 
 
Though seemingly punching below its weight in relation to world trade, the picture is slightly 
more positive when intra-African trade is taken as a percentage of African trade with the rest 
of the world.  The United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) supports the UNCTAD 
Report’s findings that total intra-African trade reached US$130.1 billion in 2011, 
                                                          
22
 UNCTADSTAT ‘Exports and imports of goods and services, annual, 1980-2012’ available at 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=25116 (accessed 14 August 
2013).  
23
 Vanguard ‘Intra-African trade hits $130.1 billion in 2011’ available at 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/intra-africa-trade-hits-130-1bn-in-2011-unctad-report/ 
(accessed 14 August 2013).  
24
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 25. 
25
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 25. 
26
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 11 – 12. 
27
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 10. 
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representing 11.3% of African trade with the world.
28
  Thus, intra-African trade has shown a 
more than 200% increase (in nominal terms), rising from US$45.9 billion in 1995 to 
US$130.1 billion in 2011.  It is interesting to note that the intra-African trade experienced 
positive growth in all years except for 1998-2001 and 2009, with these negative growth years 
coinciding with world economic recessions.  This dip in intra-African trade points to a 
potentially vital but oft misunderstood relationship between the appetite for intra-African 
trade and world economic conditions.  It appears (at least prima facie) that intra-African trade 
is sensitive to world economic conditions.  We return to this point later insofar as it may have 
an impact on the financial services industry having an appetite for investing in hard 
infrastructure in Africa.  For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that average intra-
African trade has consistently remained at below 15% compared with trade with the rest of 
the world.
29
 
 
Finally, the UNCTAD Report notes that intra-African exports grew at an average annual rate 
of 2.6% in the period from 2001 to 2006 and 3.2 per cent in the period from 2007 to 2011 
from a volume perspective.
30
  However, the real growth rates were 9.4% and 4.2%, 
respectively.  Expressed in nominal terms, the level of intra-African trade was $32 billion in 
2000 and $130 billion in 2011.  Most significantly, the UNCTAD Report notes that the 
increase in the value of intra-African trade over the last decade was driven by price increases 
and not by volume or real value.  In this regard, it is worth noting that while the value of 
intra-African trade increased by a factor of 4.1 from 2000 to 2011, in volume terms, it 
increased by only a factor of 1.7.   
 
The above statistics cannot be viewed in an economic vacuum.  It is vitally important that the 
structure of the African economy be taken into account when interpreting the above trade 
statistics.
31
  Put differently, what Africa produces and exports matters for intra-African trade.  
                                                          
28
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Developments in International and Intra-African 
Trade’ 8th Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration, 6 – 8 February 
(2013) 11 – 13.  
29
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Developments in International and Intra-African 
Trade’ 8th Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration, 6 – 8 February 
(2013) 24.  
30
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 11. 
31
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Developments in International and Intra-African 
Trade’ 8th Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration, 6 – 8 February 
(2013) 50 – 55.  
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The UNCTAD Report holds that the relative narrowness of African production and export 
structures and Africa’s dependence on primary commodities are inhibiting factors to the 
boosting of intraregional trade in Africa.
32
  As the above trade statistics refer mostly to trade 
in goods, the conclusion in relation to Africa’s production and export structures necessary 
leads the manner in which such trade takes place.  Put differently, it is necessary to consider 
the different ways in which the movement of goods is achieved within Africa (which, it is 
argued below, is achieved largely using road transport).
33
  
 
2.3 Cost of doing business in Southern Africa 
 
Keane notes that econometric data seems to suggest that in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) non-tariff barriers reduce intra-SADC trade, while 
increasing exports of non-SADC countries into the community.
34
  This is in the context of a 
World Trade Organisation-led global movement towards the elimination of tariff barriers.
35
  
However given the nature of non-tariff barriers, their effect on intra-SADC trade is hard to 
quantify.  Nevertheless, it is widely believed that these barriers have a negative effect on 
intra-African / intra-SADC trade and need to be addressed.   
 
For purposes of this research paper, transaction costs (transport and insurance costs) as a non-
tariff barrier bear particular relevance.
36
  Some authors argue that transaction costs are very 
high in Africa and are an impediment to the growth of intra-African trade.
37
  This is 
particularly significant in light of the data revealed by business surveys which demonstrate 
that road transport is the preferred mode for the movement of goods in the context of intra-
                                                          
32
 UNCTAD ‘Economic Development in Africa Report 2013’ Intra-African trade: Unlocking private 
sector dynamism 54 – 55. 
33
 W Naude and N Matthee ‘The significance of transport costs in Africa’, 2007 available at 
http://archive.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2007/pb05-07.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013) 
(at page 2 thereof).   
34
 J Keane ‘Impediments to Intra-Regional Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010’ available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7482.pdf (accessed 
14 August 2013) (at page vi thereof).  
35
 See ‘Understanding the WTO: Principles of the trading system’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (accessed 14 August 2013).  
36
 W Naude and N Matthee ‘The significance of transport costs in Africa’, 2007 available at 
http://archive.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2007/pb05-07.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013) 
(at page 1 thereof).   
37
 W Naude and N Matthee ‘The significance of transport costs in Africa’, 2007 available at 
http://archive.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2007/pb05-07.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013) 
(at page 2 thereof).   
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African trade.  The quality of the road infrastructure, particularly the major roads linking 
regional markets, is therefore of particular importance to intra-African trade.  The UNCTAD 
Report notes that Africa currently has fewer kilometres of roads than it did 30 years ago and 
the region has the highest costs for transporting goods in the world.
38
  This is in the context of 
competing socio-economic requirements for limited government resources at the national 
level post-colonialisation.  Some authors note that on average, transaction costs are higher for 
intra-African trade than for trade with the rest of the world.  For example, average transport 
costs in Africa represent 7.7% of total export value, which is twice the world average of 
3.7%.  Ofa writes that (i) approximately only 30% of Africa’s roads are paved, (ii) importing 
a car from Addis Ababa to Abidjan costs an average US$5 000 (compared with an average 
cost of US$1 500 to import the same vehicle from Japan to Abidjan) and (iii) over a distance 
of about 500 kilometres between Douala and Bertoua, in Cameroon, up to 47 roadblocks can 
be found.
39
  Boosting intra-African trade will therefore require extensive changes in trade 
policy and the establishment of new infrastructure specifically designed to foster it. 
 
Notably, while the above picture is true for Sub-Saharan Africa generally, it is (generally) not 
true of the SADC region.  The World Bank, in its paper on the SADC’s infrastructure, notes 
that the SADC has a well-developed regional road network that is in relatively good 
condition with almost all its regional trade corridors being paved.
40
  Significantly, the World 
Bank posits that surface transport (comprising of rail and road transport) in Southern Africa is 
the cheapest in Africa, but still more expensive than other developing countries.
41
  Compared 
with West and Central Africa, the trucking industry in Southern Africa is competitive – 
showing lower profit margins.  The World Bank also found that while the velocity of vehicles 
in Southern Africa is faster than all other regions of Africa, it remains rather slow compared 
with developed economies.  However, the World Bank found that the slow speed is only 
marginally a factor of road infrastructure (which it argues is generally of reasonable quality), 
rather it is largely influenced by administrative barriers such as border and customs clearance 
                                                          
38
 R Ranganathan and V Foster, 2011 ‘The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective”, World 
Bank (vi).  
39
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Developments in International and Intra-African 
Trade’ 8th Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration (2013).  
40
 R Ranganathan and V Foster, 2011 ‘The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective”, World 
Bank (vi). 
41
 R Ranganathan and V Foster, 2011 ‘The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective”, World 
Bank (vi). 
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processes that keep trucks stationary for extended periods of time.
42
  In this regard, the World 
Bank reports harrowing statistics that it takes between 400 and 800 hours to move imports 
from ports to landlocked countries in SADC.  Inefficiencies at ports due to long dwell times 
and lengthy customs processes account for a significant portion of the total time required to 
import goods.  The cost of transporting imports costs between $120 and $270 per tonne, 
which the World Bank notes to be expensive in absolute terms but nonetheless the cheapest 
in Africa.  Simply put therefore, the high logistics costs in SADC are mainly a function of 
delays at ports and freight charges that cumulate over long distances.  
 
Doing Business, in its latest publication of Doing Business in SADC publication states that 
excessive document requirements, burdensome customs procedures, inefficient port 
operations and inadequate infrastructure all lead to extra costs and delays for exporters and 
importers, thereby stifling trade potential.
43
  This is not restricted to the SADC region only.  
Further, Doing Business quotes that its research shows that exporters in developing countries 
gain more from a 10% drop in their trading costs than from a similar reduction in the tariffs 
applied to their products in global markets.
44
  If this research is true, then it is even more 
pertinent that transaction costs in Africa be lowered to encourage intra-Africa trade.   
 
It is no-wonder then, that the SADC has identified transport and communication 
infrastructure as fundamental areas requiring regional coordination.  
 
2.4 Cost of investing in new hard infrastructure 
 
The point is made above that SADC Member States are confronted with competing needs of 
their citizens at the national level – particularly within a post-colonial rebuilding context.45  
As regional integration hinges on regional cooperation and coordination, it is imperative that 
                                                          
42
 See W Naude and N Matthee ‘The significance of transport costs in Africa’, 2007 available at 
http://archive.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2007/pb05-07.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013) 
for support for this proposition though these authors identify a further three factors (at page 2 thereof).   
43
 Doing Business ‘Regional Profile: Southern African Development Community (SADC)’ 2012, 
World Bank and International Finance Corporation.  
44
 See P Love and R Lattimore ‘International Trade: Free, Fair and Open?’ available at 
http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/0109121ec005.pdf?expires=1376472529&id=id&accname=guest&c
hecksum=3AEE2B22D1102DF0450CFEDB78A2C4B0 (Accessed 14 August 2013) for support for 
this proposition albeit expressed in welfare gains terms (at page 67 thereof).  
45
 Section 2.3, paragraph 2. 
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analyses of the costs and benefits of regional integration are conducted at the regional and at 
the national level.  It is argued that a failure to properly consider the unique needs of each 
Member State may mean the regional integration project loses support from citizens and will 
disincentivise policymakers from pursuing it.   
 
In this regard, the World Bank reports that completing and preserving the SADC’s regional 
information communications technology (ICT)
46
, power, and transport infrastructure would 
require sustained spending of $2.1 billion annually over the course of a decade.
47
  While this 
might seem to be a large figure, it represents only about 7% of the overall infrastructure 
spending requirements (comprising both regional and national levels) for the SADC region.
48
   
 
Significantly, around $1.6 billion of the $2.1 billion a year is required for investment in new 
regional infrastructure assets, while the balance of $0.4 billion is needed to maintain the 
regional network in perpetuity once established (with most of it associated with road 
maintenance).  The World Bank, further, reports that the regional transport sector shows an 
annual spending requirement of $0.3 billion, which is lower than the $1.4 billion per year 
over the next decade required for investing in regional power assets.  A conservative estimate 
is that regional infrastructure requirements (across all infrastructure sectors) represent about 
1% of regional gross domestic product (GDP).
49
  The burden of committing such a 
substantial portion of their national budgets may prove insurmountable for smaller economies 
within SADC.  This is particularly true for the Democratic Republic of Congo, which would 
need to spend $961 million a year over the next decade to deliver the infrastructure assets 
(mainly power) needed for the region.  Mozambique’s spending needs (concentrated in the 
power sector), while significantly lower than the Democratic Republic of Congo’s needs at 
$265 million a year, are significant for a country still awakening from a devastating civil war.  
Expressed relative to GDP, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) regional spending 
requirement translate to almost 14% of its GDP.  The national economy could never plausibly 
deliver this level of financial commitment without external assistance or risking internal 
instability as it cuts social welfare spending.  
                                                          
46
 Which is critical from a customs perspective in order to reduce lead times.  
47
 R Ranganathan and V Foster, 2011 ‘The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective”, World 
Bank (viii). 
48
 R Ranganathan and V Foster, 2011 ‘The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective”, World 
Bank (viii). 
49
 R Ranganathan and V Foster, 2011 ‘The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective”, World 
Bank (viii). 
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Besides the high investment required of the DRC, a large group of countries will need to 
spend between 1% and 5% of their GDP for regional infrastructure to reach the desirable 
level of regional integration and ease of doing business in SADC. However, this has to be 
viewed in the context where a 2% commitment of GDP for a country like Zambia could 
potentially pose an impossible challenge.  In terms of current infrastructure spending, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo would need to spend over 190 percent of its current 
commitment on regional infrastructure- clearly an impossible proposition. 
 
2.5 Ways in which to fund investment in new hard infrastructure 
 
Bekele notes that the private sector (broadly) has an immense role to play in regional 
integration, particularly as private companies become too big for national markets and seek to 
expand through organic growth or acquisitions
50
  In the same address, Bekele bemoans the 
lack of (i) a stable and peaceful political environment to attract and enable investment into 
the region, (ii) critical development infrastructure, (iii) national institutions to support 
regional integration and (iv) developed legal systems.  It is clear from Bekele’s address that 
the private sector (particularly the investment community) can address at least one of these 
issues: infrastructure.  However, to do so, it requires a partner.   
 
This paper argues that there are strong indications, from a public sector perspective, that 
governments in Southern Africa, faced with competing domestic challenges arsing from their 
troubled histories and constrained by national politics, can ill afford to dedicate significant 
portions of their budgets to dealing effectively with the regional infrastructure backlog.
51
  
Further it is argued that even South Africa, which is the dominant regional economy, is 
constrained by domestic politics and lacklustre economic performance in this regard.  
Notably, South Africa has announced the roll-out of a R827 billion infrastructure programme 
over the next three years (beginning 2013) which includes building new road networks, 
reviving the ailing national rail network, building additional capacity at its ports and 
                                                          
50
 Bekele S ‘Contribution of the Private Sector to Regional Integration and Success Stories’ available 
at http://cbsintl.files.wordpress.com/2007/12/paper-for-commu-2000-on-private-sector-and-regional-
integration-sophia-bekele.pdf (accessed 23 March 2013). 
51
 Section 2.4, paragraph 3. 
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increasing its electricity supply.
52
  South Africa intends to draw the funds for this programme 
from the fiscus and from state-owned enterprises.
53
  South Africa’s National Development 
Plan
54
 (NDP) sets out that South Africa needs to spend 10% of its annual budget on 
infrastructure development.  If spending at such a rate were to be reached and maintained 
over the period of the NDP’s term, the country would have spent a total R11.8 trillion on 
infrastructure.  However, KPMG’s Planned Infrastructure Expenditure Report shows that 
South Africa is only spending closer to 8% of its GDP on infrastructure at the moment.
55
  The 
KPMG Planned Infrastructure Expenditure Report and the NDP indicate that the gap in 
spending will total R297 billion from 2013 to 2016, even taking into account the R827 billion 
committed spending.
56
  This means that South Africa will have to increase its infrastructure 
spend by 38% in order to catch up to the NDP target – failure to increase the spending means 
that the spending gap will be closer to R6 trillion by 2030.  This level of ability to commit 
national saving or draw from the fiscus is unique to South Africa within the SADC region as 
explained above.  
 
Due to sovereign constraints discussed above, the African Union and the SADC have set up 
an infrastructure coordinating body at the level of Heads of State under the Chairmanship of 
President Jacob Zuma of South Africa to (i) identify priority infrastructure projects and (ii) 
engage with the investment community to look at ways in which countries can partner with 
                                                          
52
 This excludes the possibility of increasing South Africa’s investment in nuclear technologies which 
is mooted to be the largest public tender ever issued in South African history.    
53
 R430-billion of the R827-billion to be spent over the next three years would come from the fiscus 
and R400-billion would be drawn from Eskom, Transnet and other state- owned enterprises.  The 
R430-billion from the fiscus has been allocated to build schools, hospitals, clinics, dams, lay out water 
and sanitation projects, expand electricity networks and supply electricity to over a million new 
homes, build more courtrooms and prisons and construct better bus, commuter rail and road links. 
Funding R400-billion from state-owned enterprises would be drawn from their respective balance 
sheets and from additional borrowing over the next three years, backed by guarantees from the 
National Treasury.  This would fund the ongoing building of power stations and the rolling out of new 
electricity transmission lines, as well as new rail, ports, pipelines, water-transfer schemes and various 
airport upgrades.    
Read more: 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/infrastructure/budget13b.htm#ixzz2bSGD8nYh 
(accessed 19 December 2013).  
54
 This is a government blue-print policy document which sets out where South Africa must aim to be 
in 2030. 
55
 KPMG, 2013 ‘Planned infrastructure expenditure and the NDP: Mind the gap’, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/General-Industries-
Publications/Documents/Mind%20the%20gap.pdf (accessed 19 December 2013) (at page 1 thereof). 
56
 KPMG, 2013 ‘Planned infrastructure expenditure and the NDP: Mind the gap’, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/General-Industries-
Publications/Documents/Mind%20the%20gap.pdf (accessed 19 December 2013) (at page 4 thereof). 
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the investment community to fund such projects.
57
  It is submitted that this approach takes 
into account that governments do not have the necessary financial resources to fund these 
projects, and the parties who do have such financial resources are unwilling to commit large 
amounts of their own funds without securing some form of financial or guarantee backing 
from sovereigns as a risk mitigation strategy.  Further, these forms of partnerships bring with 
them skills and technology transfers which are rich in the private sector (generally) but which 
are not available in the public sector (please see discussion on Madagascar above).  
Therefore, the private sector partners are not only funding partners but also operational 
partners over a period of time while training public officials on the effective management of 
the asset.   
 
Notably, the African Union Commission (AUC) (the executive arm of the African Union), 
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD Agency), African Development Bank 
(AfDB), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) (of which the SADC is but one) have developed the 
Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).
58
  PIDA was endorsed as the 
African infrastructure blueprint document by African Heads of State and Government at their 
18th Summit in January 2012 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  PIDA is the kind of coordinated 
infrastructure programme which has been lacking and which is welcome.  It brings together 
all of the key players from a macro-policy perspective and ensures easier coordination for 
cross-border infrastructure projects as all stakeholders are now talking to each other.
59
   
 
2.6 Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
 
However, it is submitted that the Achilles heel of PIDA is that it identifies the private sector 
as playing ‘a critical role in the implementation process, particularly in the financing, 
construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure’.60  PIDA, however, envisages that 
‘many of the PIDA projects will be public-private partnership’.  Therefore, according to 
PIDA’s architects, the private sector will be invited into the PIDA process only once the 
                                                          
57
 C Bathembu ‘Zuma tables Africa infrastructure report’ SA News.co.za 29 January 2014, available at 
http://www.sanews.gov.za/africa/zuma-tables-africa-infrastructure-report (accessed 1 March 2014).   
58
 PIDA “About PIDA” available at http://www.au-pida.org/about-pida (accessed 19 December 2013).  
59
 PIDA “Implementing PIDA” available at http://www.au-pida.org/implementing-pida (accessed 19 
December 2013).   
60
 PIDA “PIDA Stakeholders” available at http://www.au-pida.org/pida-stakeholders (accessed 19 
December 2013).  
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projects have been identified and the process only requires implementation.  Respectfully, it 
is submitted that this is not a true public-private partnership but rather envisages a cost-
sharing exercise.  PIDA should not have stopped only at bringing all of the macro-policy 
makers under one policy framework, it should have gone further to introduce the private 
sector in the project identification and design phase.  Such an approach would have realised 
that the primary drivers of regional economic integration are not States but rather the private 
sector in its quest to reach more consumers, increase efficiencies and ultimately, increase its 
returns to investors.  This proliferation of goods and services, made possible by seamless 
cooperation between macro-policy makers and the private sector, would ultimately lead to the 
welfare gains that are sought after through the pursuit of regional integration.  For example, it 
may well be that PIDA is ill-advised to pursue a broadband penetration strategy for a largely 
rural continent as mobile is cheaper and faster.  Private sector participants, who have been 
involved in the provision of internet connectivity on the continent, may be important 
stakeholders to engage with prior to the project implementation stage.  PIDA is discussed in 
greater detail at Chapter 4 of this paper.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter, supported by statistical analyses at sections 2.3 and 2.4, has demonstrated the 
enormous infrastructure investment gaps in Southern Africa.  Significantly, this chapter has 
succinctly presented the levels of investment required to address this investment gap in a 
manner which supports this research paper’s main thesis, namely that deeper integration of 
the private sector in the form of public- private partnerships is the only viable alternative to 
infrastructure development and regional integration in Southern Africa.  
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3.  
CHAPTER 3 
INFRASTRUCTURE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the ‘legislative’ or legal framework for regional integration in Southern 
Africa and how these are implemented and monitored (if at all).  Further, this chapter 
considers the challenges posed by the traditional lendor role which the private sector has 
preferred thus far and analyses the scope for mutually beneficial public – private partnerships.  
This chapter will argue, however, that implicit in the various challenges outlined herein are 
opportunities for the private sector to deepen its participation in regional integration 
initiatives at both a policy level and an investment level, and relies on a case study of the 
Maputo Development Corridor to demonstrate the efficacy of such deep public-private 
cooperation.  This chapter will also advance the argument that the private sector can provide 
a useful feedback mechanism for policy-makers on the efficacy of regional integration 
initiatives insofar as they relate to the positioning and deployment of capital in large 
infrastructure projects. 
 
3.2 The SADC Treaty  
 
The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992 (the Treaty), establishes 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as an international organisation with 
juristic personality. 
61
  Only the most relevant articles of the Treaty shall be discussed below 
in relation to this paper’s central thesis.  
 
Article 5 (1) (a) of the Treaty provides that the SADC’s objectives, inter alia, include the 
achievement of development and economic growth, poverty alleviation, the enhancement of 
the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and to support the 
disadvantaged through regional integration.  Further, Article 5 (1) (b) provides that the SADC 
shall aim to create common political values, systems and institutions.  
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The drafting of Article 5 (1) (a) lends itself to some interpretational challenges as it is 
ambiguous.  First, the achievement of development and economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, the enhancement of the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern 
Africa and support the disadvantaged through regional integration can be read to be distinct 
objectives separate from each other.
62
  This interpretation would lead to one concluding that 
the achievement of development and economic growth is separate to poverty alleviation 
which in turn is separate to enhancement of the standard and quality of life of the people of 
Southern Africa.  Most significantly however, it is argued that this interpretation would mean 
that regional integration (in this context) would be used only to support the disadvantaged.  
Though this interpretation leads to an absurdity in relation to the regional integration aspect, 
it is perfectly sound insofar as it relates to (i) the achievement of development and economic 
growth, (ii) poverty alleviation, and (iii) the enhancement of the standard and quality of life 
of the people of Southern Africa.   
 
However, this paper posits that to read Article 5 (1) (a) in this fragmented manner would 
defeat the true intention of the High Contracting Parties,
63
 and in any event, would be akin to 
putting the cart before the horse.  As argued by Mudzonga at section 2.1 above, it is through 
successfully pursuing and implementing regional integration initiatives that the achievement 
of development and economic growth, poverty alleviation, the enhancement of the standard 
and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support of the disadvantaged will 
become possible from a SADC perspective.
64
  Therefore, a second and more purposive 
interpretation is preferred.
65
  This interpretation posits that the achievement of development 
and economic growth, poverty alleviation, the enhancement of the standard and quality of life 
of the people of Southern Africa and supporting the disadvantaged are to be read together as 
outcomes of regional integration.  In this manner, it is submitted that Article 5 (1) (a) is 
interpreted to refer to the SADC’s realisation of and commitment to, regional integration as a 
way of achieving development and economic growth, poverty alleviation, the enhancement of 
the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and supporting the 
disadvantaged.  Rather than having four distinct objectives as per the former interpretation, 
Article 5 (1) (a) in fact creates only one objective – regional integration.  Put differently, 
                                                          
62
 Devenish GE Interpretation of Statutes (1996) 26. 
63
 As defined in the Treaty. 
64
 Evengelista M ‘Implementation challenges for the SADC FTA: tariff and non-tariff barriers’ (2008) 
Proceedings of the Fifth Southern African Forum on Trade (SAFT) (2008). 
65
 Devenish GE Interpretation of Statutes (1996) 26. 
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regional integration is therefore not an end in itself, but is rather a conduit to the realisation of 
the objectives set out in Article 5 (1) (a).  
 
This latter interpretation is supported by the rest of Article 5 (1) which, at Article 5 (1) (b), 
enjoins the SADC to create common political values, systems and institutions.  Read alone, 
Article 5 (1) (b) begs the question “to what end?”  However, read together with Article 5 (1) 
(a), no such question arises.  In fact, this research paper argues that Article 5 (1) (b) is a 
necessary condition precedent for the realisation of Article 5 (1) (a) and its objectives.  
 
Article 5 (2) of the Treaty sets out various actions which the SADC must undertake in order 
to achieve the objectives set out in Article 5 (1).  In this regard, Articles 5 (2) (a) – (d) and (i) 
are particularly relevant for purposes of this research paper.   
 
Article 5 (2) (a) enjoins the SADC to harmonise political and socio-economic polices and 
plans of its Member States.  Further, Article 5 (2) (b) enjoins the SADC to promote regional 
integration at citizen and corporate entity level within Member States’ territories.  Articles 5 
(2) (c) and (d) enjoin the SADC to create institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of 
resources for SADC programmes and to develop policies that eliminate barriers to the free 
movement of capital, labour, goods and services, and people, respectively.  Finally, Article 5 
(2) (i) provides that SADC must secure international solidarity and support and work to 
mobilise the inflow of public and private resources into the region.  We return to this point 
later.   
 
To achieve its objectives, the SADC has created various institutions.
66
  Of particular 
relevance for present purposes are the Summit and the Secretariat which are created in terms 
of Article 9 of the Treaty.  The Treaty provides that the Summit consists of the Heads of State 
of the Member States and is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC.
67
  Further, the 
Summit is charged with overall control of the functions of SADC and is empowered to adopt 
appropriate legal instruments for the implementation of the Treaty.  Notably, the Summit is 
empowered to delegate is authority to any institution of SADC on terms deemed appropriate 
by the Summit.
68
  Article 14 provides that the Secretariat is the principal executive institution 
                                                          
66
 Chapter 5, Articles 9 – 16.  
67
 Article 10 (1).  
68
 Article 10 (3).  
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of SADC with responsibility, inter alia, to implement decisions of the Summit, representation 
and promotion of SADC and coordination and harmonisation of policies and strategies of 
Member States.
69
  The Treaty does not define what it means by ‘representation’.  The 
meaning of the word ‘representation’ is critical in understanding the full extent or limitation 
of the Secretariat’s powers and authority.  This may mean ‘representation’ as in the ability to 
enter into or alter legal relationships
70
 on behalf of another or could have an ordinary 
dictionary meaning.
71
  This paper argues that as the Treaty maintains the sovereignty of its 
Member States, the word ‘representation’ cannot unassailably be interpreted to refer to the 
ability to enter into or alter legal relationships on behalf of another as this would likely 
infringe on the Member States’ sovereignty and the Summit’s competence.  However, as it is 
shown later in this research paper, it is desirable that the word representation be interpreted in 
the legal sense, that is, to mean the power to enter into and alter legal relationships on behalf 
of another, if the Secretariat is to meaningfully implement and monitor regional integration 
initiatives.  
 
Article 21 of the Treaty provides that Member States shall cooperate in all areas necessary to 
foster regional development and integration and shall coordinate, rationalalise and harmonise 
their macro-economic and sectoral policies and strategies in the identified areas of 
cooperation.  The Treaty identifies seven areas of cooperation, including infrastructure and 
services, industry, trade, investment and financance, and human resources development, 
science and technology.
72
  In this regard, the Treaty empowers the Summit to create such 
agreements between Member States as are necessary to determine the scope of cooperation in 
the identified areas.  These agreements are called Protocols.
73
  
 
Notably, the Treaty encourages the Member States to include non-governmental 
organisations in the process of regional integration.  As the phrase ‘non-governmental 
organisation’ is not defined in the Treaty, this research paper takes it to mean any entity 
                                                          
69
 Article 14 (1).  
70
 LAWSA, Vol 1 The act of representation  and Truter, Crous, Wiggill & Vos v Udwin 1981 4 SA 
68 (T). 
71
 "representation" Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. HarperCollins 
Publishers. Available at Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/representation 
(accessed 17 August 2013). 
72
 Article 21 (3).  
73
 Article 22.  
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(corporate or incorporate) which is not governmental.
74
  This broad definition includes the 
private sector.  
 
Finally, Article 25 of the Treaty provides that SADC shall be responsible for the moblisation 
of resources for its own use (administration) and those required for the implementation of its 
programmes.  In furtherance of its objectives, the SADC is empowered to create such 
institutions as may be necessary for the effective and efficient application of resoruces for 
regional development.
75
   
 
3.3 The SADC Protocol on Trade, 1996 (as amended) 
 
The SADC entered into a Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development 
Community Region in 1996 (the Trade Protocol) and subsequently amended it in 2000, 2007 
and 2008 in relation to Article 12 (dealing with Rules of Origin).   
 
Given that this is not a treatise on the Trade Protocol, selected sections of the Trade Protocol 
which may have led to an increase in regional trade will be discussed in this research paper.   
 
The objectives of the Trade Protocol are, inter alia, to liberalise intra-regional trade in goods 
and services, ensure efficient production with SADC by basing trade on the principle of 
comparative advantage,
76
 enhance economic develop, diversify and industrialise SADC 
economies and establish a Free Trade Area.
77
  The above objectives are informed by the 
SADC’s understanding that trade in goods and services and the enhancement of cross-border 
investment are key areas of cooperation in SADC and further, that increased intra-SADC 
                                                          
74
 This definition is at odds with the generally understood definition of non-governmental 
organization referring to a voluntary group of individuals or organisations, usually not affiliated with 
any government which is formed to provide (public) services or to advocate a public policy.  “non 
governmental organization” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Available at 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/759090/nongovernmental-organization-NGO (accessed 
17 August 2013) 
75
 Article 24 (2).  
76
 Comparative advantage refers to the ability of a country to produce a particular good or service at a 
lower marginal and opportunity cost over another. Even if one country is more efficient in the 
production of all goods (absolute advantage in all goods) than the other, both countries will still gain 
by trading with each other, as long as they have different relative efficiencies.  
77
 Article 2.  As discussed at Chapter 1 (paragraph 1.2), the SADC FTA was inaugurated in August 
2008 by 11 of the 14 SADC Member States.  
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trade and investment is essential to the economic integration of SADC member states.
78
  
Kalaba and Tsedu, in their 2008 paper, noted that at the commencement of the TP (i.e. in 
2000) SADC’s total exports were marginally in excess of US$50 billion.  By the end of 2006, 
the value of SADC exports was over US$113 billion.
79
  Intuitively this points to some 
success regarding the implementation of the Trade Protocol.  
 
As the pre-eminent legal text on the rights and obligations of SADC member states in relation 
to cross-border trade in goods and services, the Trade Protocol has to deal with such issues as 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, duties, quantitative restrictions and, most importantly for this 
research paper, the modalities of achieving such cross border trade (including rules of origin, 
customs procedures and institutional arrangements pertaining to monitoring and evaluation of 
the Trade Protocol, trade policies of member states and relations between SADC member 
states inter se on the one hand and relations between SADC / SADC member states and third 
parties on the other).  
 
One of the objectives of the Trade Protocol is the creation of a Free Trade Area.
80
  As such, it 
is no surprise then that Articles 3 to 6 of the Trade Protocol deal with the obligation of SADC 
member states to eliminate import / export duties as well as remove and / or refrain from 
introducing any new forms of non-tariff barriers to intra-SADC trade.    
 
While the provisions of the Trade Protocol discussed above are noteworthy but expected of a 
trade agreement, the key aspects that will determine the Trade Protocol’s success are inter 
alia (i) is there adequate regional infrastructure to move the goods efficiently and (iv) are the 
correct institutional mechanisms in place to support the implementation of the Trade 
Protocol?  It is submitted that the absence of clarity and coherence in any one of these 
questions posed herein has the potential to derail the successful implementation of the Trade 
Protocol.   
 
Significantly for purposes of this research paper and in response to the question whether there 
is adequate regional infrastructure to move goods efficiently, Articles 5, 6 and 8 to Annex 2 
concerning the Customs Cooperation with the SADC provides for the simplification and 
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 Preamble to the Trade Protocol.  
79
 Kalaba M and Tsedu M ‘Implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol and the Intra-SADC Trade 
Performance’ (2008) Southern African Development Research Network, 4.  
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 Article 2(5) – see footnote 77 for more information in this regard.  
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harmonisation of customs procedures, computerisation of customs operations and cooperation 
in training among customs agencies in the SADC region.  However, though the legal 
framework to do so is in place and though there are SADC customs procedures, it is 
regrettable that Article 6 of Annex 2 relating to computerisation of customs procedures has 
not been universally implemented within the SADC region.  Even the region’s largest 
economy, South Africa, has only recently moved from a paper-based customs administration 
system to a computer-based system (contrast this with the discussion on Madagascar at 
Chapter 2 above).
81
  This means that the region does not have adequate regional 
infrastructure to ensure the free movement of goods in SADC and thereby support 
implementation of the Trade Protocol.  This is not surprising as SADC Member States are at 
varying levels of development.  However, as discussed at Chapter 2, this situation is 
improving as more countries embrace technology and as systems integration among customs 
agencies gains traction.
82
  Paying for the infrastructure remains a continuing challenge.  
 
Finally, it is important that the question whether the correct institutional mechanisms are in 
place to support the implementation of the Trade Protocol is answered.  A striking feature of 
the Trade Protocol is that it is fundamentally an agreement between sovereign states and does 
not envisage a SADC institution with authority to administer customs on behalf of the 
member states.  Each member state has certain obligations but these are then watered down 
with phrases such as ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of..., Member States may...’ or 
‘Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a Member State from...’   
 
This ambivalence on the part of SADC members contributes to the challenge of 
implementing the Trade Protocol and its ambitious objectives as it remains subject to the 
domestic challenges of member states.  Further, even though Article 2 of Annex V 
concerning trade development envisages that the private sector shall be intimately involved in 
the formulation and implementation of trade policies, this involvement is at country level and 
so also falls prey to domestic politics.  In any event, even if the private sector were to 
somehow ignore domestic politics of its country and craft policies that are devoid of domestic 
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 IT Web ‘SARS customs system to reduce red tape’, 2013 available at 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66814 (accessed 30 
December 2013).   
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 Tech Central ‘SA drags customs into 21st century’, 2013 available at 
http://www.techcentral.co.za/sa-drags-customs-into-21st-century/43448/ (accessed 30 December 
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challenges, that policy would then still be subject to scrutiny by the other member states at 
SADC level.   
 
In the circumstances, it appears prudent that the Trade Protocol should be placed within the 
exclusive remit of the SADC Secretariat and the business community must engage directly 
with the Secretariat so that the document that is produced is a SADC document and will be 
defended by the Secretariat – arguably a neutral party with only the SADC’s interests to 
protect.  Further, as the primary market participants, the business community will be best 
placed to constitute a vital feedback mechanism to the SADC Secretariat on the 
implementation of the Trade Protocol.
83
  Such an institutional mechanism reduces the 
reporting levels from a minim fourteen levels (being the number of SADC members) to a 
maximum of four (being the SADC Secretariat, the committee of senior officials, the 
committee of Ministers and the Summit).   
 
This mechanism would also be in line with the SADC’s own Private Sector Involvement 
Strategy in Customs Matters (PSISCM) which envisages a three pronged private-sector 
engagement system comprising (i) strengthening Customs to Business dialogue mechanisms 
at the Member States level,·(ii) enhancing the quality of Customs Administration to Business 
dialogue, through improving information flows and (iii) strengthening private sector 
involvement on customs issues at the regional level.
84
  The PSISCM envisages that the 
private sector can be involved at Member State level but can also be involved directly at 
regional level without necessarily first going through Member States.  This allows for 
flexibility and for certain issues to be expedited.  Though not embodied in a Protocol, the 
mechanism provided by the PSISCM offers the most feasible and integrated mechanism to 
address the lack of deep private sector involvement in policy design and implementation in 
SADC at the moment.  
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 SAIIA ‘PERISA Case Study 1 Private Sector The Non-Tariff Barrier Monitoring Mechanism’ 
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3.4 The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment, 2006 
 
The primary objective of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment is stated as the  
 
‘harmonisation of the financial and investment policies of the State Parties85 in order 
to make them consistent with objectives of SADC and to ensure that any changes to 
financial and investment policies in one State Party do not necessitate undesirable 
adjustments in other State Parties’.86   
 
Fundamentally, the objective of the protocol (and the SADC) is to achieve sustainable 
economic development, growth and eradication of poverty.  
 
Though this research paper focuses on private-public partnerships in the design, funding, 
construction and maintenance of hard infrastructure in SADC, the supporting financial 
infrastructure is vital to the realisation of seamless trade within the region.  In this regard, this 
research paper would be deficient if it did not consider the payment and clearing of funds for 
hard infrastructure and trade generally, the extent to which exchange controls may either 
impede or enable investment in infrastructure and / or enable seamless cross-border trade, 
how investment is to be attracted into the region and how the public sector can partner with 
the private sector in large cross-border projects, and finally how returns on investment will be 
treated from a tax perspective and repatriated out of the region (if necessary).  Though the 
issues identified immediately below are uniquely ‘public’ in that they fall primarily within 
the competence of governments, this research paper will demonstrate that the private sector 
remains a vital stakeholder and feedback mechanism for efforts by states to enable 
investment and trade in the region.   
 
As alluded to above, Article 2(2) of the protocol envisages a number of areas of cooperation 
which will lead to the attainment of the goals of economic development and poverty 
eradication, including macroeconomic stability and convergence, exchange control policies, 
the legal and operational framework of Central Banks (as defined in the protocol), payment, 
clearing and settlement systems, bank supervision, development finance institutions (DFIs), 
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SADC stock exchanges and the creation of a SADC Project Preparation and Development 
Fund.  Clearly, it can be seen that at first glance, these issues intuitively fall within a ‘public’ 
paradigm.  However, as regional integration is an area which requires cooperation between 
states and the private sector and there is often an overlap of competencies, this research paper 
will demonstrate that the issues identified are not in the exclusive domain of states.  
 
The SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment has two striking features, namely (i) the 
principal text is short and all substantive provisions are contained in the Annexes, and (ii) it is 
concerned with the legal and operational independence of Central Banks in the region.  
Though this latter feature of the protocol would appear to be superfluous in the South African 
context where the South African Reserve Bank has always enjoyed operational independence, 
this is not the case in a number of countries where the central bank functions much like a 
government department.
87
  Further, the question that arises is to what extent the private sector 
should be concerned with the legal framework and / or independence of the Central Bank.  
These points are traversed in the discussions below.  
 
As with the discussion on the Trade Protocol, the discussion on the SADC Protocol on 
Finance and Investment will focus only on the provisions and / or annexes which are most 
relevant for purposes of this research paper.  This research paper will not discuss in any great 
detail any aspect of the protocol but will rather point out deficiencies and recommend certain 
policy actions to bolster the provisions of the protocol and make them more business friendly.  
However, as the Protocol on Finance and Investment is highly technical and its annexes 
dense; it will be dealt with differently.  Each relevant article and annex will be discussed 
separately below.  The following articles (and their respective annexes) will be discussed: 
 
 Article 5 relating to taxation and related matters; 
 Article 11 relating to activities of DFIs; and 
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 The South African Reserve Bank (the Bank) was established in terms of section 9 of the Currency 
and Banking Act, No. 31 of 1920 (Banking Act).  The Banking Act was subsequently repealed and 
replaced by the South African Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989 (SARB Act).  The Bank’s 
establishment is provided, and its operational independence is assured, in terms of sections 223 to 225 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution).  Section 224 (2) of the 
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 Article 16 relating to the development of a SADC Project Preparation and Development 
Fund. 
 
Finally, this section will respond to the questions posed above relating to the true nature of 
the Protocol on Finance and Investment, i.e. whether it is uniquely ‘public’ or is a hybrid 
document and if so, to what extent is there scope for private sector integration.   
 
Article 5: Cooperation in Taxation and Related Matters 
 
This is arguably one of the most important provisions of the protocol.  The tax treatment of 
investments and investment returns not only affects investors’ appetite for investment in 
certain jurisdictions, but it also affects cross-border trade.  In all transactions, who and how 
one is liable for taxation is a critical question to ask as it may mean the difference between a 
profitable venture and one that, due to taxation in various guises and jurisdictions, is not 
financially viable.  Further, taxation is a deeply cherished and guarded sovereign competence 
as it goes to the heart of a state’s ability to raise revenue.  However, within the context of 
regional integration and the creation f regional investment markets, State Parties have to 
compromises on this politically-charged matter in the interests of regional convergence.  
Acknowledging this reality, Article 5 provides that State Parties shall cooperate in tax matters 
and shall coordinate their tax regimes.   
 
As a first step to coordinating tax regimes between State Parties, Article 2 of Annex 3 
provides that the State Parties shall create and maintain a publicly available SADC Tax 
Database.
88
   In the ordinary course, States compete for investment and in so doing, may offer 
various incentives to the private sector to encourage it to invest in its territory.  The SADC, 
recognising that its members are at different levels of development and therefore that others 
are able to offer insurmountable tax incentives over other, has in Article 4 proscribed the 
introduction of tax legislation which prejudices another State Party’s economic policies or 
activities, or the regional mobility of goods, services, capital and /or labour.  This is of course 
a sensible provision if the benefits of integration initiatives are to flow to all members and not 
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only to the economically large members.  In any event, State Parties are obliged to adhere to 
common guidelines for tax incentives in the region.
89
   
 
In relation to the vital issue of the treatment of repatriated income or returns on investment, 
the Protocol on Finance and Investment provides that State Parties shall (i) develop a 
common policy for the negotiation of Tax Agreements between them and with countries 
outside the region, and (ii) collectively establish a comprehensive network of agreements for 
the avoidance of double taxation.
90
  The risk of double taxation is ever present in cross-border 
trade and / or investment and would dampen investor appetite in SADC for regional projects.  
As such, distinction would need to be made between regional investments or investments 
with a regional effect / dimension and investments of a domestic nature.  The former 
investment is a prime candidate for double tax avoidance.   
 
Further, and in recognition of WTO obligations, the State Parties have recorded their 
undertaking to gradually substitute taxes on internationally traded goods and services with an 
indirect tax on consumption.
91
  The use of the word ‘internationally’ in this context is 
confusing as it may mean goods or services traded between SADC Member States and third 
parties or goods or services traded amongst SADC Member States.  As this Annex deals with 
relations between SADC Member States, the latter interpretation appears most likely.   
 
Annex 3 is a valuable tool to attracting investment and trade in the region as it responds to the 
tax treatment of returns and goods.  However, it does not respond to the issue of repatriation 
of returns.   
 
Article 11: Facilitation of Activities of DFIs 
 
This Article provides concrete partnership opportunities between governments and the private 
sector in the identification, design, funding and implementation of cross-border projects.
92
  In 
this regard, the State Parties agreed to establish a Development Finance Institutions (DFI) 
Network with the aim of cooperation between the DFIs and ultimately increase cross-border 
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 Annex 3, Article 4 (1).  
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flows of finance for projects.
93
  Annex 9 states the DFI Network’s objectives as to inter alia 
collaborate on Projects, pool resources for the mobilisation of finance for Projects and joint 
investing in new structures where considered necessary.
94
  As this is merely a network, it has 
no stand-alone institutional structures but has provisions for meetings at executive level and 
how it reaches its decisions.  This flexibility is welcome.  
 
Article 11 and Annex 9 however miss an important opportunity.  Neither of them designate 
the DFI Network or individual DFI’s as the institutions that will interface with the private 
sector in relation to project design and finance.  Ultimately, this appears to be left with the 
State Parties, thereby diminishing the role of DFIs.  This observation is particularly relevant 
as DFI’s are operationally independent from their shareholder government and are tasked 
with investing only in commercially viable projects.  As state owned entities, it is difficult to 
see why the state would not delegate its project finance competence to these specialised 
vehicles that they have set up, opting instead to create a dual-system of government-backed 
and / or DFI-backed projects.  DFIs are market players while the state is not.   
 
Private investors, arguably, would prefer to partner with DFIs in projects as DFIs are business 
oriented and are not grant agencies – they are also profit driven.  This is particularly the case 
in jurisdictions where the rule of law is respected as the investment climate will not change 
depending on the government of the day.  This is a serious lack of foresight on the part of 
State Parties and this research paper recommends that DFIs be made the official named 
parties in public-private partnership projects as it lends a degree of predictability in business.   
 
This paper argues that the SADC’s present practice of appointing one State Party to 
underwrite a project and to sign contracts on its behalf means that there is no uniformity (of 
whatever kind) in SADC projects and regrettably, no institutional capacity or memory within 
SADC institutions on how to negotiate contracts of this nature and monitor implementation 
thereof.  This expertise would be available within DFI’s and furthermore, DFI’s would be 
better placed to go as a consortium into the financial markets to raise project finance based on 
the strength of their balance sheets as opposed to States that are affected by social, political, 
fiscal and macro-economic factors when trying to raise finance on the open market. 
 
                                                          
93
 Annex 9, Article 3.  
94
 Annex 9, Article 3.  
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Article 16: Development of a SADC Project Preparation and Development Fund 
 
This Article enjoins State Parties to establish a Project Preparation and Development Fund to  
 
‘finance the preparation and development of projects by way of providing technical 
assistance towards project identification, project selection and feasibility studies and to 
participate in the financing of selected projects’.95   
 
Whilst this is a welcome initiative particularly in risky projects where investors would not 
willingly invest alone without some form of state backing or guarantee, the discussion on 
Article 11 relating to DFIs remains relevant to an analysis of this provision.  State Parties 
have already formed agencies which are tasked with project finance and development 
initiatives, it is therefore peculiar for the State Parties to then reserve the Project Preparation 
and Development Fund to them rather than delegating that competence to DFIs which have 
the expertise in this area.  Further, as discussed above, DFIs are able to raise capital from the 
capital and financial markets in ways which States are not able.  Furthermore, DFIs can raise 
capital on the back of their balance sheets and would not be penalised for any perceived (or 
real) political risk as they do not depend on the fiscus.  Of course, DFI’s could have state 
guarantees where possible so that financially weak DFI’s financial obligations are backed by 
the relevant government.  This method of raising project finance is more market friendly and 
insulates State Parties from paying higher interest rates merely because they are perceived to 
be unstable.  The real benefit of project finance based on this model would be even greater 
where it was raised via the DFI Network as financial and other risks would be shared 
amongst SADC DFIs – some of which have enviable balance sheets (for example, South 
Africa Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa).  
 
3.5 The SADC Protocol on Transport and Communications, 1996 
 
The thesis of this research paper is that deeper public-private partnerships are necessary for 
regional integration initiatives to succeed in Southern Africa.  In this regard, focus on hard 
infrastructure (for example roads, rail and airports) and soft infrastructure (for example 
customs administration information systems) have been identified as prime examples where 
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such cooperation between SADC Member States and the private sector would be 
advantageous.  Against this backdrop, the Protocol on Transport, Communications and 
Meteorology in the SADC Region (the Protocol on Transport) provides the framework for the 
development of both the hard- and soft-infrastructure mentioned above.  
 
Article 2.1 of the Protocol on Transport states its objectives as the establishment of transport, 
communication and meteorology systems which provide efficient, cost-effective and fully 
integrated infrastructure and operations.  These objectives are augmented by Article 2.1 
(dealing with the scope of the Protocol on Transport’s application) which provides that its 
scope: 
 
‘comprises the entirety of the transport, communications and meteorology sectors in 
each Member State and the region, including but not limited to – (a) all policy, legal, 
regulatory, institutional, operational, logistical, technical, commercial, 
administrative, financial, human resource and other issues; (b) international, 
continental, regional and national dimensions; and (c) the public and private sectors 
in each Member State, as well as collectively in the region, to the degree that their 
activities overlap with the subject matter of this Protocol.’ 
 
For the first time, a protocol which from the outset includes the private sector and adopts an 
integrated approach to infrastructure planning is in place.  The Protocol on Transport has 
been drafted in such a manner that any stakeholder who is affected by it has been provided 
for and acknowledges that the public sector cannot deliver on the infrastructure challenge on 
its own.  This acknowledgement is implicit in the recognition of overlaps with the private 
sectors’ activities at Article 2.1(c).  
 
Further, Article 2.4 enjoins the Member States to engage all stakeholders in implementing the 
Protocol by promoting certain strategic goals, including (i) integration of regional transport, 
communications and meteorology networks to be facilitated by the implementation of 
compatible policies, legislation, rules, standards and procedures;
96
 (ii) broad-based 
investment to develop, preserve and improve viable strategic transport, communications and 
meteorology infrastructure within an investor-friendly environment generating adequate 
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returns;
97
 (iii) optimal utilisation of public and private financial, human and other resources 
and the effective allocation of existing scarce resources;
98
 (iv) co-operative policy 
development facilitated by strategic partnerships between government and a responsible and 
competent regional private sector;
99
 (v) adequate own funding and appropriate supplementary 
funding, amongst others, through recovery of full costs for maintenance of infrastructure and 
service provision and progressive recovery of full future costs for infrastructure and service 
provision on an equitable basis;
100
 (vi) customer driven service provision characterised by 
adequate access to basic transport, communications and meteorology services and 
progressive improvement of service quality;
101
 and (vii) focused investment in joint human 
resource development programmes, information management schemes, research and 
development projects and technology transfer initiatives.
102
  
 
Article 3.1 (dealing with the Protocol’s objectives in relation to integrated transport) states 
that Member States shall promote economically viable integrated transport service provision 
in the region to support the development of major regional development corridors and 
facilitate travel between the territories.  The word ‘corridor’ is defined in the Protocol to 
mean ‘a major regional transportation route along which a significant proportion of Member 
States’ or non-Member States’ regional and international imports and exports are carried by 
various transport modes, the development of which is deemed to be a regional priority’.103  In 
this regard, Article 3.2 provides for the development of harmonised integrated transport 
policy among the Member States which addresses the (i) establishment of infrastructure, 
logistical systems and institutional frameworks; (ii) establishment of appropriate legal and 
financial frameworks; and (iii) development of effective communication networks which 
support intra- and intermodal
104
 synergy and the optimal utilisation of modes.  Most 
importantly, and perhaps fundamentally for the realisation of true regional integration, Article 
3.2(2) obliges the Member States to develop the integrated transport policy on the basis of 
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certain principles, including (i) the right to freedom of transit for persons and goods, (ii) the 
right to land-locked Member States to unimpeded access to and from the sea and vice versa, 
and (iii) equality of treatment of the nationals and passenger service providers of Member 
States with regard to the provision, access and use of infrastructure and immigration and 
clearance procedures.  These principles are vital as they establish a legal framework for the 
identification, design, financing, implementation and monitoring of corridors.  Article 3.3 
mandates Member States to inter alia cooperate in providing, operating and maintaining 
transport infrastructure and, notably, provides that Member States shall promote the 
management of existing and future infrastructure by both the public and private sectors. 
 
The Protocol on Transport creates a vibrant institutional framework for its implementation by 
providing that Member States shall involve all transport modes in promoting intra- and 
intermodal cooperation between stakeholders and shall support the development of regional 
development corridors.
105
  Further, the protocol enjoins Member States to promote the 
establishment of cross-border multimodal Corridor Planning Committees comprising of 
public and private sector stakeholders from the Member States whose territory or territories 
are traversed by such corridors.
106
 
 
An example of the successful implementation of the objectives and institutional framework of 
the Protocol on Transport is the Maputo Development Corridor which links the landlocked 
provinces of Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga, South Africa with the port of Maputo, 
Mozambique.  The Maputo Development Corridor comprises road, rail and customs 
infrastructure and impacts also on the right to free movement of persons (border control).  
The principal objectives of the Maputo Development Corridor have been identified as the 
rehabilitation of existing core infrastructure; the attraction of investment to the corridor and 
the region; making the corridor sustainable through relevant policies and strategies; and to 
maximise the impact of investing in and developing the corridor.
107
  The realisation of the 
above objectives, much like the theory underpinning the pursuit of regional integration 
initiatives, is anticipated to produce benefits that include enhancing cross-border trade; 
opening up neighbouring markets to one another, granting access to global markets; 
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increasing cross-border tourism; encouraging private investment; and using private-sector 
investment to displace the use of public sector resources.
108
   
 
Bowlan and Otto writing in the South African Institute of Foreign Affairs’ series of policy 
briefings, note that “The Maputo Development Corridor is the largest and most successful 
development corridor initiative thus far in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region, if not within Africa as a whole.”109  The authors identify three features as 
being distinctive about the Maputo Development Corridor initiative, namely (i) its efficient 
management and successes in terms of public–private partnerships, (ii) the crucial role it has 
played in the broader, regional initiative of linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans via the 
Trans-Kalahari and Capital Corridors and (iii) the level of political will at executive level to 
see the successful implementation of the corridor.  A defining feature of the institutional 
mechanisms supporting the development of the Maputo Development Corridor is the Maputo 
Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI).  The MCLI is a non-profit organisation comprising 
infrastructure investors, service providers and stakeholders from Mozambique, South Africa 
and Swaziland who are focussed on the promotion and further development of the Maputo 
Development Corridor as the region's primary logistics transportation route.
110
  The MCLI 
describes its vision as: 
 
‘To become the leading corridor stakeholders’ coordinator, contributing to the aims 
and objectives of the Maputo Development Corridor. This will be achieved by 
working towards a logistics Corridor based on excellence - a cost-effective, 
continuous, reliable logistics route, creating an enabling environment for further 
investment and development, with positive returns for all stakeholders. The MCLI’s 
strategic objectives are described as ‘To coordinate the views of service providers and 
users of the Corridor to promote development and change, making the Maputo 
Development Corridor the first choice for the region’s importers and exporters alike.  
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To inform the market about the Corridor and to market the strategic benefits and 
opportunities offered by the Corridor’. 111 
 
Bowlan and Otto described the MCLI as having been a crucial public-private partnership in 
the coordination of activities in the region and lobbying to address outstanding issues that act 
as constraints to regional trade, development, investment and the free movement of people.  
The authors’ further comment that the MCLI has assisted in facilitating cooperation, allowed 
for networking, and enabled the resolution of logistical and operational issues by offering a 
platform through which all stakeholders can engage.
112
  In their assessment, which is 
supported by arguments made in this research paper, the authors surmise that initiatives like 
the MCLI should be encouraged as they provide a platform for different actors and users 
(public and private) to coordinate their activities and to voice and address operational 
concerns.  Put differently, such initiatives can help to increase the efficacy of operating other 
corridors as all stakeholders are included in a single forum and are well versed in the reasons 
for a corridor being pursued.  Further, the authors note that public-private partnerships should 
be promoted.  Public-private partnerships, particularly in a region with countries at different 
stages of development with some facing serious domestic challenges, can provide financing 
for fiscally constrained countries, and can play a strategic role in garnering the support and 
increased involvement of the private sector.
113
  The involvement of private sector partners 
increases confidence on the part of other market players that a project will materialise and 
will do so efficiently and cost-effectively.  Therefore, public-private partnerships as 
witnessed in the case of the Maputo Development Corridor can be of crucial importance for 
the success of other corridors.  
 
Though the Protocol on Transport includes infrastructure, and infrastructure was defined as 
part of ‘soft’ infrastructure at chapter 1,114 as the communications sector is highly regulated, 
concentrated and due to the sheer magnitude of capital costs involved in participating in this 
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sector is dominated by state actors, this sector will not be discussed in this paper.
115
  Dynamic 
synergies between the public and private sector and the public sector are limited in this area 
and in any event, brilliant communications infrastructure in the region is not a pre-condition 
to regional integration or cross-border trade and investment.  It merely facilitates ease of 
doing business.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
All of the above protocols
116
 and their associated documents create the framework for the 
private sector to participate in SADC programmes and identify opportunities in which they 
can partner with SADC Member States to deliver the required infrastructure for regional 
integration.  However in order for the private sector, through the vehicle of public-private 
partnerships, to meaningfully participate in the policy design and project implementation 
landscape in the region; something more needs to be in place.  In this regard, realistic and 
measurable plans for the implementation of these protocols and associated documents are 
critical.  This research paper discusses such plans in the following chapters.  
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 James Hodge and Keith Weeks ‘The Economics of Telecommunications and Its Regulation’ 
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4.   
4.1  
CHAPTER 4.1 
REGIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
Beyond creating the enabling legal framework for the private sector to participate in regional 
integration initiatives in the region (which can be interpreted either broadly or restrictively), it 
is imperative that a strategy be devised on how the Member States foresee the protocols being 
implemented.  In this regard, the SADC region has developed its blueprint strategy, the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan which provides for the identification of 
projects and foresees how the private sector can go about exploiting such opportunities in a 
manner that frees resources from the public purse but also ensures vibrancy of the regional 
private sector.  In addition, the AU has developed the Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa.  Both these strategies are analysed below. 
This chapter will firstly put forward the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
followed by a discussion of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa.  
Thereafter, this research paper will argue (at chapter 4.2.1) that a robust private sector and a 
visionary legal architecture will be required for implementation of the SADC legal 
framework for regional integration.  
 
4.1.2 Trade, Economic Liberalisation and Development 
 
The SADCs impetus in this area is driven by its belated realisation that implementing trade 
and economic liberalisation initiatives earnestly and successfully leads to economic growth
117
 
and improvement in the quality of life.  This is because, as argued at Chapter 2 of this 
research paper, investors are on a search for economies of scale and efficiency gains in 
                                                          
117
 This research paper acknowledges that, at least in the beginning, not all countries benefit from a 
liberalisation process.  Indeed, some countries may experience severe hardship as their industries face 
increased competition from foreign firms and result in loss of jobs and tax revenue.  However, as 
these countries adjust and find their comparative advantage, they too will benefit from a trade 
liberalisation programme. However, in the interim, it is vital that a revenue loss mechanism be put in 
place to offset the initial loss of revenue by the State otherwise social programmes in that State may 
be adversely affected and this may lead to social unrest and a mistrust of the trade liberalisation 
process.  
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production.  This phenomenon means that markets now need to be competitive at domestic 
and international levels and the bigger the market, the higher the levels of investment it 
attracts.  Key to the SADC’s success in this area will be the full and timely implementation of 
the Trade Protocol and the Protocol on Finance and Investment.  However, important 
milestones have already been missed in relation to the Trade Protocol, including setting up a 
Customs Union by 2010 and a Common Market by 2015.   
 
4.1.3 The Private Sector 
 
The RISDP recognises that a developed private sector, complemented by a dynamic public-
private partnership environment, encourages better orientation of the economy towards 
meeting human needs.
118
  In this regard, the RISDP commits the Member States to view the 
private sector as a strategic vehicle through which to achieve its objectives of deeper 
integration and poverty alleviation.  In pursuit of the above goals, the RISDP makes the 
argument that the private sector, as the primary driver of growth, be integrated into the 
SADC’s policy and strategy formulation, and programme implementation.  As a concrete 
measurement of its commitment to this goal, the RISDP provided a period of three years 
(2001 – 2004) for the development of a SADC policy on Public-Private Sector Partnership.  
Regrettably, this has not materialised to date.  However, the RISDPs target that a Private 
Sector Unit be institutionalised within the Secretariat to provide support to the Secretariat and 
regional private sector units by 2004 has been met.  The work of this unit is ably supported 
by the SADC PPP Network
119
 which is a platform for the exchange of information and 
experiences, and promotes capacity development of PPP capabilities in the public and private 
sectors as well as promoting harmonisation of PPP policy and regulatory frameworks in the 
region.  The mission of the SADC PPP Network describes its mission as the strengthening of 
the public sector’s capacity to engage in PPPs.120 
 
4.1.4 Infrastructure Support for Regional Integration 
 
As per the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology, the RISDP recognises 
                                                          
118
 Page 63, paragraph 4.8.1 of the RISDP. 
119
 Available at http://www.sadcpppnetwork.org/.  
120
 Tralac ‘Private and public sectors announce first ever Joint Dialogue Session’, 2013 available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2013/09/26/private-and-public-sectors-announce-first-ever-joint-dialogue-
session/ (accessed 9 January 2014).  
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that the availability of sufficient, integrated efficient and cost-effective infrastructure is vital 
to promoting and sustaining regional economic development, trade and investment.  Without 
the correct hard-and soft infrastructure, trade and cross-border investment and capital flows 
are hindered.  In relation to this broad area, the RISDP aims to inter alia promote sustainable 
sources of funding for the provision and maintenance of infrastructure, promote the use of 
public-private partnerships in the provision of infrastructure and services, liberalise hard 
infrastructure and harmonise policies that affect the cross-border movement of people and 
goods.
121
 In relation to the transport sector, the RISDP had set the year 2008 as the target year 
for the full liberalisation of the transport market and the harmonisation of rules, standards and 
policies.  The extent to which this has been successfully implemented in 2013 is questionable 
as there is no SADC common vehicle registration or driver licensing regime for instance.   
 
In its discussion on how the RISDP could be financed, the RISDP differentiates between 
funding for SADC’s coordinating functions and financing for development activities.  The 
former financing refers to funding the Secretariat and various other SADC Institutions and 
programmes.  Put differently, this refers to funding the SADC bureaucracy.  The RISDP 
identifies primarily public sources of funding for its institutions, comprising transfers from 
the fiscus of its members, official development assistance, debt relief, domestic savings (see 
discussion above on the use of pension funds) and DFIs / the DFI Network.  
 
In relation to funding for financing of development activities, the RISDP identifies four broad 
mechanisms namely public-private partnerships, financial and capital markets, private equity 
and venture capital and the SADC Development Fund.  Though the RISDP does no more 
than repeat the discussions already traversed above in relation to public-private partnerships, 
its discussion in this instance differs in two material respects.  In the first instance, the RISDP 
identifies a seemingly closed list of various options available in partnering with the private 
sector.  These include lease contracts
122
, concessions
123
, build-operate-transfer or build-own-
                                                          
121
 Page 69, Paragraph 4.11.4.3. 
122
 A lease contract is defined as the situation when “a private company rents facilities from a 
municipality and assumes responsibility for operation and maintenance. The lessee finances working 
capital and replacement of capital components with limited economic life and fixed assets remain the 
responsibility of the public partner.”  
123
 A concession is defined to mean the situation where “a private company handles operations and 
maintenance and finances investments in addition to working capital of a public partner. The public 
partner exercises a regulatory and oversight role and receives a concession fee for this arrangement.” 
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transfer (BOT)
124
 and corporatisation
125
.  Significantly, the RISDP also puts percentage and 
time targets on public-private partnerships – by providing that there must be a 70:30 ratio of 
public-to-private financing of physical infrastructure by 2010 with this ratio increasing to 
50:50 by 2015.   
 
However, these two points betray the dynamism of the market and the private sector.  
Limiting the options for how a public-private partnership could be structured to only four 
options, though providing predictability and certainty for business, also restricts innovation 
on how infrastructure and services can be delivered (financed).  The possibility of hybrid 
structures has not been explored.  Though the RISDP cannot be expected to anticipate and 
provide for every conceivable scenario, as an enabling framework, it must provide built-in 
flexibility to permit both the public and private sectors to be innovative in how they partner 
and how they raise finance in the open market or privately.  Nevertheless, this research paper 
is mindful of the challenges that a highly regulated and political arena like the public sector 
pose and that standardisation and regulation are more-often a necessity than a luxury.
126
  
Secondly, though the quantification of targets is welcome, there is no indication that the 
private sector was consulted on the ‘ideal’ mix of public-private funding for infrastructure.  
In any event, as key strategies and policies relating to finance and investment have not been 
implemented, the achievement of this goal at a regional level is doubtful.  Strong economies 
like South Africa, Tanzania and Botswana could arguably unilaterally achieve this goal.   
 
In respect of financial and capital markets, the RISDP again acknowledges that a well-
developed and robust financial system increases flows of foreign investment into the region.  
However, the RISDP does not create the linkages between this increase in foreign investment 
flows with a sound rule of law and respect for property rights (see the discussion on the 
SADC Tribunal above).   
 
                                                          
124
 A BOT is defined as “a form of concession with an emphasis on construction of new, stand-alone 
systems and comes in several variations.” 
125
 Corporatisation is defined a when “a government entity forms a separate legal corporate entity to 
manage service provision. These corporate entities are often referred to as ‘utilities’ and are 
partnerships in the sense that government creates a separate contractual ‘partner’.  
126
 South African National Treasury – PPP Unit ‘Standardised Public-Private Partnership Provisions’, 
available at 
http://www.ppp.gov.za/Legal%20Aspects/Standardised%20PPP%20Provinsions/National%20Treasur
y%20PPP%20Practice%20Note%20No%201%20of%202004;%20Standardised%20PPP%20Provisio
ns;%20First%20Issue;%2011%20March%202004_1.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014).   
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Interestingly, the RISDP identifies both private equity
127
 and venture capital
128
 as possible 
sources of funding for infrastructure.  However, venture capital appears to be an 
inappropriate form of financing for large infrastructure projects as it is geared for start-up 
enterprises and is limited in its financial scope (typically from R1 million to R10 million).  
Private equity, however, is appropriate for the region’s infrastructure programme and the 
RISDP correctly notes that there has been a proliferation of transnational private equity funds 
which have a mandate to invest in different regions or countries.
129
 This observation is 
supported by financial institutions that are active in this area.
130
  The African Development 
Bank (AfDB), in its report on private equity investment trends on the continent, notes that 
investments in infrastructure by pension funds and insurance companies are improving and 
that having a specialised public sector institution like the AfDB as a partner reassures 
investors that there is a solid, experienced player in the continent’s infrastructure space 
working alongside them to ensure that projects are completed effectively.
131
  These investor 
concerns relate to political risk, rule of law and property rights and Africa being an emerging 
market.  Thus perceptions and how the legal institutions set up to regulate conduct operate are 
critical to attracting investment to the region.  The success of the Maputo Development 
Corridor is in large part because it involves two of Southern Africa’s most legally and 
politically stable countries and is in large part anchored on South Africa’s dominant and 
private-sector led economy.  Simply put, the private sector trusts the private sector and as the 
                                                          
127
 Wuite R The South African Dictionary of Finance (2009) 304 defines private equity as “The 
process of wealthy individuals or specialised funds seeking extra returns by buying undervalued assets 
which are often public companies, delisting them if they are listed and then holding on to them for a 
period before selling them at significant profits in the future. Private equity firms usually use 
substantial amounts of debt to capitalise the companies they buy. Private equity firms often take 
active management roles in the firms they purchase. Pension funds do not allocate investment 
resources to private equity companies or funds as they are risky in nature.” 
128
 Wuite R The South African Dictionary of Finance (2009) 400 defines venture capital as “The 
provision of equity capital, usually seed capital, to non-listed firms. Venture capitalists help to 
develop new products, expand working capital, strengthen balance sheets and make new acquisitions. 
They seek high returns because they take on significant levels of risk as the probability of the 
businesses in which they invest going bankrupt is high. Up to 40% returns are often required by VCs. 
Sometimes called risk capital.”  
129
 Page 80, paragraph 5.3.3 of the RISDP. 
130
 BDLive ‘Stanlib launches African infrastructure equity fund’, 2013 available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2013/06/11/stanlib-launches-african-infrastructure-
equity-fund (accessed 9 January 2013).  
131
 African Development Bank ‘Private Equity Investment in Africa: In Support of Inclusive and 
Green Growth’, 2012 available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-
Documents/Private%20Equity%20Investment%20in%20Africa%20-
%20In%20Support%20of%20Inclusive%20and%20Green%20Growth.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014).  
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region has historically been socialist (or at least the State has been the main market player), 
its leaders have yet to fully appreciate the private sector and its potential.  
 
The RISDP predates the Protocol on Finance and Investment and so does not analyse the role 
of the SADC Development Fund.
132
   However, as discussed in the section on the Protocol on 
Finance and Investment, the SADC Development Fund ought to be housed within a DFI or an 
institution like the AfDB so that sector expertise straddling both the public and private sectors 
can be utilised.  As demonstrated by the AfDB, it is easier to raise finance from the capital 
and financial markets where a DFI is a lead partner – purely on a business trust basis.   
 
This observation (on cooperation between the public and private sectors and the effect of this 
on financing, construction and maintenance of projects) has a profound impact on how the 
other strategies that are offshoots of the RISDP ought to be formulated.  This refers to 
strategies like the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan for the Transport Sector 
and various other sectors which each have their own Infrastructure Development Master 
Plans.  All of the principle issues relating to how the private sector ought to be integrated into 
the policy design, and implementation phase prior to actual project identification, finance, 
construction, and maintenance remain applicable to every other strategy that comes out of the 
RISDP process or SADC Protocols.  The challenge for the Secretariat will be to ensure that 
there is symmetry and convergence between the regional strategies and policies inter se (and 
the RISDP is a good starting point) and between the region’s policies and strategies and 
continental strategies and policies.  The importance of the latter point will become clearer 
below.  
 
4.1.5 The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
 
The SADC Summit met Namibia in March 2001 and, amongst other issues, approved the 
restructuring of SADC institutions (the restructuring).
133
  One of the noteworthy outcomes of 
the restructuring was the grouping of the previous 21 sectors recognised by SADC into 
                                                          
132
 The Protocol on Finance and Investment only came into effect in 2006 while the RISDP was 
launched in 2001, some 5 years earlier.  
133
 SADC ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/ 
(accessed 9 January 2014).  
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clusters operating under four directorates at the Secretariat.
134
  Further, the Summit approved 
the establishment of SADC national committees with the mandate of coordinating individual 
Member State’s interests in relation to SADC.135  However for purposes of this research 
paper, the Summit’s single-most critical decision was to approve the preparation of a 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) by the Secretariat to inter alia 
complement the restructuring and to provide a clear blueprint for SADC policies and 
programmes over the long term.  As the restructuring was aimed at configuring SADC 
institutions and processes to be coherent and deliver an efficient and coordinated service to 
the region, it was also vital that the new institutions follow a coherent and integrated 
blueprint in executing their mandate. 
 
Thus the RISDP served to align the SADC’s strategic objectives and priorities with the 
policies and strategies to be pursued towards the attainment of those objectives over a fifteen 
year period.  As discussed above,
136
 there has often been discord between the SADC’s stated 
objectives and the policies it drafts or alternatively, the manner in which those policies are 
implemented.  The SADC has lacked an integrated approach to pursuing its agenda and the 
RISDP was designed to remedy that challenge.  This is because the Secretariat recognised 
that the SADC’s policies, strategies and programmes were not properly coordinated, 
particularly across sectors and this led to sub-optimal regional integration results.  The 
RISDP, as the region’s premier blueprint strategy from an economic perspective, identifies 
and strengthens synergies, programmes and policies of the various sectors recognised by 
SADC with a view to improving efficiency and delivery of SADC’s programmes.137  Further, 
the RISDP sets clear and measurable targets for implementation of the SADC’s goals and 
                                                          
134
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 13 thereof).   
135
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 13 thereof).   
136
 See discussion on Article 16 of the Protocol on Finance and Investment. 
137
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 55 thereof). 
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builds in monitoring mechanisms into its framework.
138
  Perhaps most importantly, the 
RISDP finally recognises the Secretariat as a central implementing and coordinating agency 
and in so doing, provides the Secretariat and other SADC institutions with clear guidelines on 
SADC's approved social and economic priorities and policies, and, therefore, enhances their 
effectiveness in discharging their facilitating and coordinating role.  This is particularly 
important when considering that the Secretariat has to engage with a diverse group of 
stakeholders across various sectors and needs to convey a consistent message to all 
stakeholders.
139
  This degree of certainty is vital for the private sector to be able to properly 
assess opportunities and risks in the region and to anticipate state action on matters of interest 
to it.  
 
An interesting feature of the RISDP is that it does not start off merely stating a desired future 
outcome, rather, it spends a reasonable amount of time reviewing existing social and 
economic policies and strategies and how the SADC’s development from the SADCC, the 
acceptance of South Africa into the SADC and the various other key events have shaped and 
impacted on these policies and strategies.  It is argued therefore that this contextual 
placement is critical in understanding policy design, implementation, possible unintended 
consequences and its amendment or repeal.   
 
In a similar analysis as that carried out in this paper, the RISDP seeks to conduct a review of 
the challenges and/or successes of six key areas of regional cooperation in relation to the 
private sector, namely (i) trade, (ii) industry, (iii) finance, (iv) investment and (v) 
infrastructure and services, and (vi) communications.  These six key areas of cooperation are 
grouped into four clusters and this research paper proposes to adopt the same clusters as the 
RISDP’s.  However, only two of these clusters are relevant and will be discussed.  These are 
firstly trade and secondly transport and communication: 
 
                                                          
138
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at Chapter 7, pages 91 - 93 thereof). 
139
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at Chapter 6 thereof). 
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4.1.5.1 Trade 
 
The RISDP acknowledges that trade is a traditional catalyst to regional integration and is a 
key driver for growth and poverty reduction.
140
  The RISDP makes the point that finance and 
investment usually follow only after a sustainable and stable trade regime has been 
established.
141
  The logical persuasion of this proposition is all to clear – people and firms 
trade in the ordinary course and as part of their human and economic survival.  Trade is 
therefore a base need.  Finance and investment can only follow established trade patterns to 
further strengthen them as risk will (presumably) be lower at that stage.    
 
The RISDP makes the point, from an economic perspective, that the region is largely a 
producer of similar primary goods (i.e. no product differentiation on the basis of comparative 
advantage).
142
  This challenge is set to remain for some time as the region is endowed with 
significant quantities of metals and minerals and has some of the world’s most arable land.143  
This phenomenon is evident in that the approximately 90% of the region’s exports comprise 
of (raw) mineral and agricultural goods.
144
  The RISDP therefore proposes that the SADC’s 
key policies, strategies and protocols be reviewed against this historical and economic 
backdrop.   
 
The RISDP focuses on the Trade Protocol as the Protocol on Finance and Investment was not 
in existence at the time of its drafting.  As to be expected of a blueprint document, the RISDP 
begins its analysis from a future point (2008) where the Trade Protocol envisages that there 
                                                          
140
 Page 23, paragraph 3.2.1.  
141
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 65 thereof). 
142
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 24 thereof). 
143
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 24 thereof). 
144
 Southern African Development Community, 2001 ‘Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan’, available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf 
(accessed 9 January 2014) (at page 24 thereof). 
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will be a Free Trade Area.
145
 However, the RISDP also notes that the achievement of an FTA 
is not an end in itself; it is a starting point to achieving a Customs Union and ultimately a 
Common Market.  It then asks the question how the region will get to a Free Trade Area.  For 
the sake of brevity, it suffices to note that the RISDP raises the same points as raised in the 
discussions above relating to implementation of the Trade Protocol and the harmonisation of 
customs rules and procedures.
146
  However, the RISDP raises additional key concerns of an 
economic and legal / political nature relating to trade in the region.  From an economic 
perspective, the RISDP identifies supply side constraints and competitiveness of SADC 
industry as key concerns requiring urgent action.
147
  From a legal / political perspective, the 
RISDP identifies the thorny issue of overlapping membership of SADC Member States to a 
number of other regional organisations which sometimes impose conflicting obligations on 
them.
148
  Professor Bhagwatti refers to this phenomenon as the “spaghetti bowl”.149    
 
4.1.5.2 Transport and Communications 
 
4.1.5.2.1 Transport 
 
As anticipated, the RISDP focuses on the objectives and implementation of the Protocol on 
Transport, Communications and Meteorology.  The objectives and implementation of the 
Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology are discussed at Chapter 3 above 
and for the sake of brevity, are not repeated herein.  For the sake of completeness, it is noted 
that this paper does not discuss any aspects relating to meteorology.   
 
The implementation of the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology has 
been remarkably successful, particularly in relation to the transport sector.
150
  This success 
does not appear to have been a fortunate coincidence but rather the result of coordinated 
action and a realisation from SADC that public resources could not alone resolve the 
                                                          
145
 The Trade Protocol (as amended) envisaged that there will be a SADC Free Trade Area by 2008.  
This has not materialised, at least not completely.  
146
 See discussion at Chapter 3, section 3.3, paragraph 7. 
147
 Page 25, paragraph 3.2.2.3 of the RISDP. 
148
 Page 25, paragraph 3.2.2.3 of the RISDP.  
149
 Bhagwati J ‘US Trade Policy: the infatuation with FTAs’’ available at 
http://www.academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/.../econ_9495_726.pdf (accessed 9 January 
2014).  
150
 See discussion at Chapter 3 on the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
transport challenge.  In this regard, the RISDP had identified raising sustainable funding for 
the provision, rehabilitation and maintenance of infrastructure, attracting the private sector 
through public-private partnerships and promoting regional development corridors as 
microcosms of regional integration as key building blocks for achieving the protocol’s 
objectives.  The identification and development of the Maputo Development Corridor as 
discussed in section 3.5 has all of the above ingredients and is an example of the successful 
implementation of the RISDP and the protocol.  It is therefore ripe for replication in the 
region.  
 
4.1.5.2.2 Communications 
 
Though this research paper does not focus on communications for the reasons identified at 
section 3.5 above, it bears mention that in its discussion of so-called ‘cross-cutting issues’, 
the RISDP dedicates entire sections to analyses of the private sector and the ICT sector.   
 
4.1.6 Private Sector Engagement 
 
In its analysis of the private sector, the RISDP makes the bold-statement that ‘The SADC 
region is evolving from a largely state controlled economy to a private sector led 
economy.’151  However, the RISDP notes that there is no coherent framework for how the 
private sector ought to be engaged in the region and relations between the public and private 
sector are characterised by strong cooperation in some Member States to cautious 
acknowledgement in others.  The RISDP appears to be supportive of this paper’s prime thesis 
that oftentimes the private sector is simply handed policies for implementation but had not 
been invited to participate in the policymaking process.  The RISDP makes a second, and 
perhaps bolder statement by stating that  
 
‘In those countries where the public sector sees it as mandatory to consult the private 
sector on policy, legislation and programmes that affect business, markets tend to be 
better regulated and developed and business environments are more attractive to both 
internal and external investors.’152   
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 Page 49, paragraph 3.6.4.1 of the RISDP.  
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 Page 49, paragraph 3.6.4.1 of the RISDP.  
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This assertion by the RISDP supports this papers thesis that the role of the private sector 
transcends the traditional passive financier role.  The RISDP appears to support the 
proposition that deeper engagement between the private and public sectors will result in 
better policies being drafted and implemented as the private sector is a key market 
participant.  It is respectfully submitted that the RISDP’s observations at the national level 
are equally relevant to the regional level (as seen with the development of the Maputo 
Development Corridor).   
 
Finally, the RISDP makes two fundamental observations in relation to relations between 
SADC / public sector and the private sector, namely that a SADC policy for strong public-
private partnerships and dialogue needs to be developed and that the private sector needs to 
be integrated into the SADC framework.  However, the RISDP stops short of taking this line 
of argument to its conclusion, namely that integration of the private sector into the SADC 
framework on a regional basis will require enhancement of the Secretariat’s role to more than 
being a mere administrative arm.  It is argued that the Secretariat may need to be elevated to 
an executive arm with all the concomitant powers and authority to act on behalf of the 
SADC.  At present, only the Summit has this authority.
153
     
 
Having done an analysis of the challenges facing the region in achieving its integration 
objectives, particularly in relation to trade, finance and investment and the free movement of 
people and capital; the RISDP identified a number of priority areas for targeted focus and 
intervention.
154
  For purposes of this research paper, only three will be discussed, namely (i) 
the private sector, (ii) trade, economic liberalisation and development, and (iii) infrastructure 
support.   
 
4.1.7 The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
 
The SADC region is but one of the various regions which are said to be the building blocks of 
the African Economic Community (AEC).
155
  In fact, Resolution CM/Res.464 QCXVI of the 
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 Articles 10 (1) and 10 (2) of the Treaty.  
154
 Page 55, Chapter 4.  
155
 The African Economic Community is established by Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community (commonly known as the Abuja Treaty).   
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Organisation of African Unity’s156 Council of Ministers157 divides the continent into five 
regions, namely North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa.   
 
As such, the RISDP and other policies and/or strategies of the SADC region cannot be 
viewed in a vacuum but must be aligned with the African Union’s overall continental 
strategies as part of the six phase step to the realisation of the AEC.
158
  Put differently, the 
Secretariat has to ensure that there is symmetry and convergence between the region’s 
various strategies and policies inter se (and the RISDP is a good starting point) and between 
the region’s policies and strategies and continental strategies and policies. 
 
In this regard, the African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development (PIDA) is 
relevant.  PIDA is a joint initiative of the African Union Commission (AUC), the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA), and the 
African Development Bank (AfDB).  As discussed above, the involvement of a DFI like the 
AfDB in such programmes reassures investors that there is a solid, experienced player in the 
continent’s infrastructure space working alongside them.  This is vital for increasing investor 
confidence in the context of an emerging market and attracting investment flows into the 
region.  For the sake of completeness, it is noted that the regional economic communities, 
private sector and civil society are also noted as partners in PIDA.  However, of particular 
concern is that PIDA identifies the private sector thus “As a key partner in infrastructure 
development, the private sector plays a critical role in the implementation process, 
particularly in the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure.  In 
partnership with governments, many of the PIDA projects will be public-private 
partnership.”159  This formulation of the private sector’s role in infrastructure development in 
Africa as only a finance, construction and maintenance partnership limits the potential scope 
of robustness of the relationship as demonstrated by the successful implementation of the 
Maputo Development Corridor and the principles underlying the RISDP.  This philosophical 
disjuncture between the SADC as an AEC building block and PIDA as a continental strategy 
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meant to align all five AEC regions is fundamental and will require harmonisation.  As 
argued in this research paper, the private sector should be involved at a policy and 
infrastructure conceptual stage due to its role as not only a financier but importantly as the 
primary consumer or client of infrastructure and services in Africa.  
 
The PIDA comprises 51 programmes and projects designed to address sector-specific priority 
infrastructure deficits in energy, transport, ICT and trans-boundary water.  PIDA’s goal is to 
accelerate the implementation of regional and continental infrastructure by 2040 by 
implementing short-and priority projects by 2020, medium-term projects between 2020 and 
2030, and long-term projects between 2030 and 2040. 
 
As this research paper’s focus is on the role of the private sector vis-à-vis regional trade, 
finance and investment in the pursuit of effective regional integration, only PIDA’s 
programmes in relation to transport and (minimally) ICT will be considered.  ICT (forming 
part of soft infrastructure) is critical for regional customs process digitisation and as an 
enabler of payment, settlement and clearance systems for the movement of capital. 
 
A recent study focused on the African Regional Transport Infrastructure Network (ARTIN) 
in relation to transport in Africa (the study).
160
  The ARTIN consists of the Trans-African 
Highways plus 40 key corridors carrying 40% of Africa’s international trade, 19 ports 
handling 70% of the continent’s international trade, and 53 airports handling 90% of the 
continent’s air traffic.  In relation to ICT, the study focused on intercontinental and regional 
connectivity accounting for 90% of Africa’s voice and data traffic.161  
 
The study first reflected on Africa’s key economic growth drivers and how Africa was doing 
relative to the rest of the developing world in economic indicators.  In this regard, the study 
found that Africa has about 20% of the world’s land mass and 16% of its population, but only 
2.5% of its gross domestic product (GDP).
162
  As already discussed in this paper, the study 
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concluded that Africa is endowed with natural resources and these have historically been its 
main economic driver.  Besides its mineral wealth, new economic drivers have emerged 
namely population growth and rapid urbanisation.  The study found that the continent’s 
population is projected to increase from 1 billion in 2010 to about 1.8 billion in 2040 (Figure 
2.2)—much faster rate than for other continents—and to pass those of China in 2025 and 
India in 2030.  Further, urbanisation is forecast to increase from 40% in 2010 to 56% in 2040, 
approaching but not reaching China’s anticipated level of 68%.163  United Nations estimates 
show that by 2040 the proportion of Africans aged 15–64 years in the world’s population of 
this age group will reach 20%, second only to Asia (with 60%) and leaps ahead of Europe 
(8%) and the Americas (12%).
164
  This age group is economically active and is primed to be 
the key drivers of consumption and production.  Finally, eight African countries were among 
the world’s 20 fastest-growing countries during 2005–09 namely Angola (1), Ethiopia (3), 
Uganda (6), Rwanda (9), Sudan (10), Mozambique (15), Tanzania (16), and Malawi (20).
165
  
Three of these, Mozambique (15), Tanzania (16), and Malawi (20) are in the SADC region.   
 
Significantly, the study estimated that the average growth rate for 53 African countries (GDP-
weighted and expressed in U.S. dollars PPP) would hover in the 6.2% per year level between 
2010 and 2040.3.
166
  A growth rate as forecast by the study implies that over a 30 year period, 
the GDP of African countries will be multiplied six-fold on average.  In the same vein, the 
study estimated that 37 countries would show growth rates in excess of 5% per year on 
average for the period 2008– 2040.  Of the 53 African countries,167 26 should record an 
average growth in excess of the continental average during this period, led by Ethiopia and 
Nigeria, with estimated growth rates of 7.8% and 7.6% per year, respectively; followed by 
Malawi (7.5%), Tanzania (7.3%), Mozambique and Benin (7.2%), and Angola (7.1%). 
 
However, despite this positive economic outlook Africa continues to face a myriad of 
challenges including that it is highly fragmented, has a large number of landlocked countries 
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and generally poor transport and communication infrastructure.  Further, Africa has over two-
thirds of the world’s least developed countries, 12 of which have no access to the sea.168  It is 
no wonder therefore that the SADC’s Protocol on Transport, Communications and 
Meteorology establishes a principle of the right of landlocked Member States to unimpeded 
access to and from the sea.
169
  Interestingly, though South Africa is not a landlocked country, 
the Maputo Development Corridor expressly recognises that South Africa’s economic hub – 
the Gauteng Province- is landlocked and therefore that a link to the Port of Maputo is vital for 
its (and the surrounding landlocked provinces) economic output to reach the region.  
 
4.1.8 Transport Infrastructure  
 
Infrastructure plays a key role in economic growth.  In line with the statistics discussed at 
Chapter 2 (paragraph 2.4) of this paper, Calderón notes that Africa loses about 2% of its 
economic growth per year on account of inadequate infrastructure.
170
  The road access rate in 
Africa is said to be only 34%, compared with 50% in other parts of the developing world, and 
transport costs are higher by up to 100%.  Internet penetration rates are abysmally low at 
about 6%, compared to an average of 40% elsewhere in the developing world. 
 
In its forecast of future freight transport demand, the study estimated that transit traffic from 
landlocked countries will increase 10–14 times over the next 30 years.  Expressed in 
tonnages, West Africa will see its transit traffic rise from 6 million tons to 65 million tons in 
2040; Southern Africa increasing from 13 million to 148 million tons; and East Africa 
increasing from 10 million tons to 149 million tons (buoyed by Southern Sudanese exports 
through this region).  Djibouti is anticipated to experience increases in transit traffic from 9 
million tons to 76 million tons.  
 
On a generalised basis, port tonnage is expected to grow at 6% to 6.8% per year, excluding 
large new mining projects and crude oil, and at 5.8 to 7.8% per year including new mining 
projects.  Similarly, container traffic is expected to outpace total tonnage.  Growth in 
container traffic is expected to average 10.6% per year to 2020 (including some suppressed 
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demand released by corridor improvements) and 7.9% from 2020 to 2040 on a sustained 
basis (with all suppressed demand released).  The net result of this growth will be an increase 
in container traffic to 38 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) by 2020 and 176 million 
TEUs by 2040, a 14-fold increase. 
 
Therefore, it is a logical conclusion that as Africa’s economies grow as anticipated by the 
study underpinning PIDA, infrastructure demand and usage will also grow exponentially to 
enable that growth.  The present state of infrastructure in Africa, particularly road 
infrastructure, is woefully inadequate to meet this anticipated growth or even half of it.  As 
discussed at Chapter 2, Africa has severe construction and maintenance backlogs in relation 
to road infrastructure and the governments are unable to commit the requisite levels of 
funding for such construction and maintenance as that would necessitate rolling back certain 
domestic social welfare programmes.  That could lead to social unrest and political 
instability.  The study supports this view as it estimates that the total cost of inefficiencies in 
ARTIN operations and lack of maintenance was close to US $175 billion in 2009, with about 
half made up of increased annual costs to shippers and half in the value of suppressed 
demand.
171
  
 
PIDA submits that improvements in policies, institutional practices, and IT systems have the 
potential to greatly increase the efficiency and capacity of border posts, ports, railways, and 
airports.  In the table below, PIDA’s analysis appears at first glance to focus only on the 
public sector – in support of its earlier criticised view of the private sector as only an 
infrastructure finance and maintenance partner.  
 
Potential gains in capacity from policy changes and institutional actions 
Mode Type of policy action Type of institutional change % 
capacity 
increase 
Ports and 
multimodal 
facilities 
Eliminate constraints on 
containers for inland use 
and reduce stripping of 
Developing inland container depots 
and dry ports to move container 
processing out of the ports, institute 
10-30% 
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Mode Type of policy action Type of institutional change % 
capacity 
increase 
containers in ports or inland 
depots 
single window, re-engineer customs 
processes to reduce dwell times 
Railways  Restructure concession 
agreements to provide 
public funding for track 
improvement and 
rehabilitation. 
Restructure concession agreements 
to support more equipment and 
rolling stock provision by private 
partners, and incentives for best 
practice management 
100-
500% 
Border posts Support single window, 
integrated border 
management and smart 
corridor technology to 
reduce border times 
Implement One-Stop Border Posts 
and smart corridor technology 
100-
200% 
Air 
navigation 
system / 
airports 
Develop new means of 
financing for satellite-based 
air navigation system 
Implement satellite-based air 
navigation system and change 
means of financing air navigation 
10-30% 
 
However PIDA implicitly acknowledges the role of the private sector (and expressly 
acknowledged in relation to railways) as well – though this implicit acknowledgment is 
simply not sufficient.  As the RISDP correctly acknowledges  
 
‘In those countries where the public sector sees it as mandatory to consult the private 
sector on policy, legislation and programmes that affect business, markets tend to be 
better regulated and developed and business environments are more attractive to both 
internal and external investors.’172  
 
Deeper integration of the private sector in PIDA is therefore essential and the role of the 
private sector should not be implicit, it must be expressly provided for and encouraged.  
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PIDA appears to be taking the principles of cooperation between the public and private 
sectors argued for in this paper and belatedly supported by the RISDP, backwards.  However, 
this situation cannot be countenanced particularly considering that the same study 
underpinning PIDA found that four transport corridors are expected to experience demand of 
more than 15,000 vehicles per day by 2030.
173
  This development will require the 
construction of modern four-lane motorways.  Notably, among these transport corridors is the 
Maputo Development Corridor which has the deepest integration between the public and 
private sectors of all the other corridors.  Further, nine border crossings are expected to 
exceed 2,000 heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) per day by 2040, with three reaching that level 
by 2030.  This level of HGV traffic requires special corridor development with modern 
motorways and special truck facilities.  The three priority corridors are the Djibouti, 
Northern, and North-South corridors. 
 
On a continental level, PIDA correctly identifies the transport infrastructure backlogs and at a 
finance and investment level, correctly identified that it needs a credible market oriented 
institution like the AfDB as a partner in order to attract the private sector.  However, PIDA is 
sorely lacking in forethought and depth as it does not adequately deal with how the private 
sector can be integrated into its programmes.  PIDA does not envisage an engaged private 
sector which is a primary consumer of the infrastructure that it is trying to rehabilitate and/or 
construct, rather it lumps the entire private sector as an arms-length financier – which is not 
an accurate point of departure.  PIDA is public-oriented and considers the AUC and the 
NEPAD Agency its primary partners.  However, as argued throughout this paper (in relation 
to cross-border infrastructure) the private sector and the potential of public-private 
partnerships are also a primary partner as they are in the unique position of being consumers 
and potential financiers of these projects.  
 
4.1.9 ICT Infrastructure  
 
In a marked departure from this research paper’s analysis on the ICT sector,174 the PIDA 
study found that Africa’s ICT sector will continue to show rapid growth over the coming 
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decades, with the bulk of investment coming from private enterprise.
175
  However, the study 
limited its scope of continental and regional infrastructure to end-to-end fibre optic cable 
capable of carrying data traffic from one country to a submarine cable landing station in 
another country, as well as networks that use national infrastructure to obtain better 
connectivity between two or more countries.  In light of this limitation, the study’s assertion 
that private enterprise will comprise the bulk of investment in the ICT sector appears to be 
doubtful, particularly as communications sectors are largely in public hands with the 
liberalisation process stuck in a political and regulatory quagmire.  Nevertheless, the study 
proceeds to note that in order for investment in ICT to generate the greatest possible 
economic benefit, stimulate healthy competition with a view to bringing prices down and 
expand access to millions more Africans, five conditions need to be met.  The study identifies 
these as: 
 
 operators in every country must have access to intercontinental bandwidth through 
competitive gateways to submarine cable landing stations; 
 the regional fibre optic infrastructure must be free of missing links; 
 Africa’s countries must complete their telecommunications reforms at the national 
level, eradicating the vestiges of past monopolies, expanding competition in the widest 
array of services, and enabling the private sector to redouble its already considerable 
investment in Africa’s ICT infrastructure; 
 the RECs must increase their capacity to help national governments harmonise their 
technical and regulatory practices along the lines already developed by the RECs and 
 Africa must strive to develop its own internet exchange ports176 and data centres to 
lower bandwidth costs. 
 
The study notes that more than 90% of the infrastructure installed by mobile operators in 
Africa uses radio link technology.
177
  This is because it is cheap and quickly installed, but 
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also because private mobile operators are generally prevented by regulations from using other 
land-based methods.  A marked feature of land-based communications (data and voice) in 
Africa is that it is dominated by de facto or de jure monopolies created or tolerated under 
many country’s legal and regulatory frameworks.  Where countries do not have strong 
competition law regimes to monitor these monopolies and the prices at which they sell access 
to their public-funded backbone infrastructure, it is rarely offered to private operators at a 
reasonable price.  A case in point was Telkom’s (South Africa’s de facto monopoly land-
based communications company which used to be a statutory monopoly) abuse of its 
dominance over a more than 10 year period during which it sought to drive out small private 
operators from the data market.  Telkom was subsequently fined an amount of R449 million 
for its conduct by the South African competition authorities. 
178
  
 
4.1.10 Conclusion 
  
PIDA’s conclusion that there is likely to be increasing demand for ICT services in Africa, 
particularly to support cross-border trade, finance and investment flows (which this paper 
argues are essential components of regional integration initiatives), it is doubtful that the 
private sector can meaningfully participate in land-based ICT technologies as 
telecommunications reforms still need to be undertaken at national level.  However, private 
sector investors like Seacom are making investments in sea-based fibre-optic networks.
179
  
 
Much as the discussion on the Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology, the 
telecommunications sector on the continent needs to undergo thorough economic analysis to 
understand its historical context and competitive pressure (including supply and demand 
trends) in order to refashion its regulatory framework, to have a more regional outlook.  
Further, as communications do affect issues of national security, it may have to be accepted 
that this is not a sector that can undergo complete liberalisation.  Regardless, a lot more 
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liberalisation in relation to data and intra-country connectivity can be accommodated.  As the 
private sector has fewer concerns (if any) about national security than public utilities, this 
area again presents optimum opportunities for public-private partnerships and lessons from 
the private sector in relation to cross-border communications from the mobile 
communications industry can be shared.  Significantly however, the Southern Africa region 
now has a framework agreement in place which not only recognises the integral role of the 
private sector in regional integration initiatives but one which goes further to set goals and 
timelines for its implementation.  This is bolstered by the RISDP’s acknowledgment that the 
SADC region’s economy is ‘evolving from a state led economy to a private sector-led 
economy’.  This development cannot be overemphasised.  
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4.2  
 
CHAPTER 4.2 
A ROBUST PRIVATE SECTOR AND VISIONARY REGIONAL LEGAL 
ARCHITECTURE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SADC’S REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION INITIATIVES 
 
4.2.1 Introduction  
 
As demonstrated through the discussions at Chapters 3 and 4.1 above, the SADC’s record in 
successfully implementing its regional integration agenda is at best a chequered one.  Notably 
however, it is clear from the discussions above that the SADC’s implementation record has 
been dramatically better in instances where implementation initiatives involve deep 
partnership with the private sector.  This paper has argued that the private sector should be 
involved from a policy development as well as a project implementation perspective.
180
  This 
proposition makes intuitive sense and is borne out by the success of the Maputo Development 
Corridor initiative – the private sector is the primary beneficiary of successful regional 
integration initiatives.  Furthermore, the private sector is the only stakeholder amongst 
sovereign States and civil society which has its sole purpose reaching as many consumers as 
possible at the lowest possible cost, using the least amount of resources and at the shortest 
possible time.  This is the only way for it to be able to maximise profit.  As such, the private 
sector’s deep involvement in policy design and project implementation for regional 
integration is not a nice-to-have, it is vital to the success of the programme.   
 
Geda and Kibret put it succinctly when they state that implementation of the various regional 
protocols often rests on ‘the understanding, conviction, and confidence of the private sector’ 
and as such ‘an active involvement of this sector is crucial’.181  These authors proceed to 
argue that States should establish specific government entities to promote and administer 
economic integration at a country level to not only demonstrate their commitment to regional 
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integration but also enhance the effectiveness of implementing the various protocols.
182
  
Though cast in broad terms, this argument is congruent with this paper’s argument at section 
3.4 that the DFI network and the DFI’s themselves ought to be lead partners in regional 
integration initiatives as they are market oriented.  
 
4.2.2 The ‘traditional’ role of the private sector 
 
The seminal expression of how the role of the private sector has been defined in the region is 
contained in PIDA and is captured thus: ‘As a key partner in infrastructure development, the 
private sector plays a critical role in the implementation process, particularly in the financing, 
construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure.  In partnership with governments, 
many of the PIDA projects will be public-private partnership.’183  
 
This formulation of the private sector’s role in infrastructure development in Africa as only a 
finance, construction and maintenance partnership limits the potential scope of robustness of 
the relationship between the public and private sectors.  This problem appears to have its 
roots on countries’ reluctance to create supra-national bodies and transfer power to them as a 
sanctioning authority.
184
  Geda and Kibret, in complete agreement with this paper’s assertion 
that the SADC Secretariat’s role and profile as a supra-national authority with power to deal 
directly with the private sector, note that the secretariats that are formed in regional 
communities do not have the legal power to force countries to fulfil their obligations – such 
as reducing tariff rates and other trade barriers in accordance to their commitments.
185
  
 
As argued in this paper, the private sector should be involved at a policy and infrastructure 
conceptual stage due to its role as not only a financier but importantly as the primary 
consumer or client of infrastructure and services in Africa.  
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4.2.3 Conclusion 
 
As stated at section 1.3, Southern Africa’s regional trade landscape is characterised by 
inefficient and costly rules and cross-border trade procedures due to poorly designed and 
implemented regional integration initiatives.  As demonstrated in the discussions on the 
SADC Legal Framework this problem is exacerbated by the lack of investment in hard 
infrastructure in the region.
186
   
 
The lack of investment in infrastructure ultimately results in higher prices for consumers in 
Southern Africa as cross border traders have to factor in duplicate customs costs, higher 
vehicle maintenance costs as well waiting time at border posts.  It was argued that taking into 
account the significant infrastructure development backlog in the region and in domestic 
markets, public actors simply did not possess the necessary funds to self-fund large 
infrastructure projects and thereby improve consumer welfare in the region.   
 
In this context, it is therefore vital for opportunities and challenges presented by public-
private partnerships to be properly understood and resolved to allow the private sector to 
assist in the region’s policy formulation and project implementation initiatives.  Ultimately 
the private sector is a primary beneficiary of a successful regional integration agenda as it is 
interested in maximising profit by having access to larger markets at the shortest possible 
time and at the least cost.  Thus there is congruence between the requirements of the public 
sector (capital) and those of the private sector (identification of priority projects, efficiency of 
implementation and access to larger markets).  However, lack of a systemic and institutional 
approach to the relationship between the public and private sectors leads to a disjointed 
approach which wastes scarce resources.  The case of the Maputo Development Corridor has 
demonstrated the attractiveness of this proposition – each stakeholder contributes what they 
know best in a coordinated fashion.  
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5.  
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY CHOICES 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 5 will outline the conclusions and recommendations drawn from this research paper 
and the preceding chapters.  The focus of this chapter will be on policy recommendations on 
how the existing regional integration initiatives can be improved in order to realise the stated 
benefits of regional integration.   
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated the enormity of the infrastructure investment gap in Southern Africa.  
In so doing, Chapter 2 concisely presented the levels of investment required to address the 
indentified investment gap in a manner which supported this paper’s thesis that deeper 
integration of the private sector in the form of public- private partnerships is the only viable 
alternative to infrastructure development and regional integration in Southern Africa.  
 
Having considered the infrastructure challenge, Chapter 3 (sections 3.3 and 3.4) undertook an 
analysis of the protocols and associated documents that create the framework for private 
sector participation in SADC programmes.  Chapter 3 found that in order for the private 
sector (through the vehicle of public-private partnerships) to meaningfully participate in 
policy design and project implementation in the region, the current protocols and strategy 
documents require amendment in a manner that would change their character from State-led 
initiatives to public-private sector led initiatives.  
 
In this regard, Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 considered the blueprint regional and continental 
integration strategies.  The regional integration strategy, the RISDP, was found to be on the 
correct trajectory insofar as it recognised the private sector as not merely a provider of 
finance and other services in regional integration initiatives.  However, implementation of the 
RISDP was found to be inconsistent and as such, its impact on facilitating regional 
integration was hampered.  The continental integration strategy, PIDA, was criticised for its 
formulation of the private sector’s role in infrastructure development in Africa as only a 
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finance, construction and maintenance one.  It was argued that such a formulation limits the 
potential scope of robustness of the relationship between the public and private sectors.   
 
Chapter 4.2 identified the root of the discord between the RISDP and PIDA as countries’ 
reluctance to create supra-national bodies and transfer power to them as sanctioning 
authorities.  Thus Chapter 4.2 argued that the SADC Secretariat’s role and profile should be 
reformed such that it becomes a supra-national authority with power to deal directly with the 
private sector and legal power to force countries to fulfil their obligations – such as reducing 
tariff rates and other trade barriers in accordance with their commitments.  
 
Chapter 4.2 found that ultimately the private sector is the primary beneficiary of a successful 
regional integration agenda as its stands to benefit most from having access to larger markets 
at the shortest possible time and at the least cost.  Thus there is congruence between the 
requirements of the public sector (capital) and those of the private sector (identification of 
priority projects, efficiency of implementation and access to larger markets) – hence the 
argument for deeper partnerships between the regional public and private sectors in a 
streamlined manner. 
 
5.3 Recommendations for Policy Choices – a meaningful partnership  
 
This paper argued that the RISDP’s recognition that a developed private sector; 
complemented by a dynamic public-private partnership environment, encourages better 
orientation of the economy towards meeting human needs, should permeate all of the 
SADC’s protocols and strategies.  SADC Member States should recognise that the private 
sector is not merely another stakeholder group which needs to be consulted on its views on 
certain projects – it is a vital partner which must understand, have conviction and confidence 
in the projects in order to (i) release the necessary funding and (ii) more importantly take the 
lead in project implementation.   
 
This third way requires a rejection of the traditional approach to the private sector as merely a 
financing partner. 
 
Furthermore, States need to streamline their interaction with the private sector at a national 
level.  As noted in this paper, SADC Member States are at different levels of economic 
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development and from a financial markets perspective, their acceptability as partners and 
therefore their ability to raise affordable capital in the open market differs considerably.  The 
ability of States to be able to access the capital markets is affected by a range a factors 
including political issues, social issues and perceptions of corruption etc.  However, States 
can insulate the regional integration agenda from these influences by creating development 
finance institutions which are operated on purely business principles in pursuit of the regional 
integration agenda.  These DFI’s would rely on their own balance sheets to raise finance and 
as publicy-owned private entities, would be charged with being the lead public partners with 
the private sector on project identification, implementation and maintenance.  This approach 
also means that a significant amount of regional project expertise will be cultivated and 
housed within the DFI’s rather than it being scattered across fourteen or more Member States.  
This institutional memory will be critical in building trust and rapport between the public and 
private sectors as long-term partners rather than ad-hoc project partners.  Where required due 
to the size and potential exposure of private sector partners in a project, individual member 
states could still be required to underwrite a project.  However, the primary responsibility to 
engage with the private sector and negotiate terms remains with the DFI or the DFI network.  
 
Perhaps the most far-reaching policy recommendation is that States need to review the role 
and status of their Regional Economic Community Secretariats – these need to be enhanced 
to have the requisite authority to act independently of member states and sufficient legal and 
coercive power to monitor member states’ implementation of regional protocols and 
strategies.  The SADC Secretariat, in particular, needs to be reformed as a supra-national 
body which has the requisite power to sanction Member States that do not fulfil their 
obligations in terms of the Treaty or the Protocols.  Essentially, this requires SADC Member 
States to cede some of their sovereignty to the Secretariat.  It is submitted that such reforms 
would streamline interaction between the private sector and the regional public sector through 
one entry point and will bring greater predictability, certainty and institutional stability to 
relations between the private sector and member states at a regional level.  Currently, the 
private sector is required to engage with each Member State as well as with the Secretariat.  
 
Combined, the enhancement of the Secretariat’s role to an autonomous body with powers of 
representation and the DFI Network or individual DFI’s as the primary entry points to 
engaging with the private sector in the region, there will be greater focus and impetus to 
regional integration initiatives.  This level of deep cooperation between the public and private 
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sectors, as ably demonstrated by the Maputo Development Corridor Initiative, leads to a 
development of trust amongst the various partners and all partners begin to understand issues 
from a common perspective.  That, in turn, leads to resources and efforts being expanded in a 
focused and mutually supportive manner rather than the disjointed manner which has 
characterised regional integration initiatives in the region to date. 
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